(1) Define internalism and externalism about justification, and illustrate their respective limitations through examples of the kind Martin introduces in chapter 4. Can you sketch a possible compromise between the two radical positions? What consequences can you foresee following from your position with respect to the very definition of knowledge (Martin p.36) ? How does Davidson’s position help overcome some of the limitations Martin illustrates in chapter 4? Can you sketch a possible compromise between the two radical positions so we to provide a better starting point for the anti-skeptic? What consequences can you foresee following from your position with respect to the very definition of knowledge?
(2) Outline and illustrate briefly what you take to be samples of your knowledge of language (Brook and Stainton 2000, chapter 3). Do you agree with Chomsky’s elaboration of the nature of knowledge of language as unlike other types of knowledge? If so, why (not)? What elements of knowledge of language do you find missing in Chomsky’s presentation, given your reading of Davidson? Do you agree with Davidson that knowledge of language (as he describes it) is quite special? Why (not)?
(3) In chapter 2 “Knowing the External World,” Brook and Stainton end their presentation of a few arguments for anti-skepticism with Wittgenstein’s argument. Compare the latter with that suggested by Davidson (“The Problem of Objectivity”). Which of the arguments do you find more promising, and why? Do you see any similarities between Davidson’s argument and that hinted at by Wittgenstein in his questions? More generally, do you think skeptical arguments are more than a mere philosophical puzzle for contemporary inquiry, and if so, why?