The second chapter in John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government’ is, as he states at the beginning, an attempt to make the reader understand the source of political power. In the absence of political power, the human being is born in the ‘state of nature’. in this state, all human beings are naturally born equal, and as such, no one person has any power over another human, and we are free to carry out our activities, and treat ourselves and our possessions in any way that pleases us without asking anybody’s permission. The modern man living in the 21st century cannot easily identify with this statement, as at no point in the recent history of the developed world has anyone been born under this ‘natural state’. It does however make sense that at some point in our distant historical past before the development of political governance structures, this might have been the case.
However, there is a flaw in this ‘natural state’ of things as with everyone being solely concerned with the advancement of their own personal agenda, there needs to be some sort of code to ensure that we do not encroach on other people’s rights. John Locke references the work of another writer, Richard Hooker, who identified that reciprocity would be the sensible approach towards determining how human beings interact with each other in this natural state. Using logical reasoning, if one expects to be treated fairly by others, then one must treat others fairly. This is consistent with Locke’s earlier statement about all human begins being born equal, and as such should treat their colleagues as human beings having the same rights as him/her. In an ideal setup, this ‘do unto others as you would like them to do unto you’ way of life would be theoretically sufficient to govern human interaction, if everybody was on board. However, human nature being what it is, there are bound to be some instances where one person encroaches on another person’s right.
This brings to focus Locke’s next argument, on who is to be tasked with enforcing the laws of nature. Every law needs enforcing otherwise it becomes obsolete, in the laws of nature which are governed by the concept of reciprocity and common sense, and in which each person is his own master, subjecting himself to nobody, who is the enforcer? Locke’s answer is that in the state of nature, everybody is tasked with the duty of enforcing the law as it pertains to him/herself, and with that responsibility comes the duty to punish those who wrong him or her. In the interests of the greater good of the community, someone who breaks the law needs punishment as a deterrent to the offender, and others, against breaking the law. This right to punish offenders is also seen by Locke as a responsibility to protect the weak and innocent. This assessment holds true to this day as it forms the basis of every well structure judicial system. Any system of law, whether instituted by nature or by fellow men, is in place to protect the society from those malicious elements within it who would infringe upon their right. Punishment is a deterrent, to discourage future law breaking by the offender as well as to serve as an example for the rest of the society members of the consequences of breaking the law.
What is of interest is Locke awarding every single person with the right to punish those who offend them in whatever way they deem fitting to act as a deterrent. There is no mechanism put in place to ensure objectivity in the punishment routine, with the specifics of the punishment left to the punisher’s prerogative. Locke uses the illustration of how a judicial system has the right to punish a foreigner within its boundaries according to its own set of laws, which might not be consistent to the foreigners laws in his/her home country. By breaking the laws while within its jurisdiction, the wronged judicial system is within its rights to punish the foreigner as its laws permit. This illustration is helpful in setting the context of Locke’s argument that in the laws of nature, every man has the right to punish someone who wrongs him/her but the parallels it draws are not similar. In the case of the foreigner being punished for breaking the laws in his/her host countries, it is safe to assume that the laws are not arbitrary in nature, and that a proper inclusive judicial and legislative process was involved in the drafting of such laws. This is not the case in the natural state.
Locke at this point introduces another aspect of the punishment process, reparations. When somebody is wronged, the punishment needs to serve two purposes: – the first is to serve as a deterrent for the offender and other would-be offenders and the second one, which is equally important, is to offer the wronged some form of reparation for the injustice that has been performed on him. Again, this statement holds true in our current legal system, where the judicial processes are divided into two major systems; the criminal justice system for the state to punish criminal offenders mainly for the purposes of acting as a deterrent, and the civil court system to handle how someone who has been wronged can be compensated for his/her losses. These two systems rarely operate separately from each other in practice, as most cases require the punishment to serve both purposes.
In the state of nature, when dealing with the issue of reparations (as it was when dealing with serving up punishment as a deterrent), the issue of objectivity is raised again. There is no way that objectivity can be guaranteed when the judge and the complainant are the same person. This is the main issue that civil government, with its judicial structures, aims to solve. Locke however, looks at civil government as one man (the king) existing within the state of nature while subjecting others under his rule. This assessment may have been accurate during the time Locke was drafting this piece as it was under the rule of an absolute monarchy. However, in the current setting, this statement could not be further from the truth, at least in a democracy setting. The head of state in a democracy is no longer above the law, like the monarchs of ancient times, in a democracy the president (or prime minister) is also subject to the laws of the land and as such can face punishment for breaking them.
John Locke, in this chapter, seems to trace chronologically the situations that must have happened in our very distant past as the prehistoric man struggled to establish a working system through which man’s interaction with the society around him could be regulated. In the natural state, everyone was the master of their own jurisdiction, with the concept of reciprocity being the only guide that governed how one treated (and conversely expected to be treated) others around him/her. The realization that there needs to be a system to deter those who broke the laws of nature by encroaching on other people’s rights therefore tasked each man with the right and duty to punish as they see fit those who have wronged them.
Leaving punishment to be the sole prerogative on the one offended leads to some questions being asked on his/her objectivity in ensuring that the punishment fits the crime. There is also the issue of determining to what extent the reparations owed to the wronged party by the perpetrator need to be determined. It is at this point that the need for involving a third, relatively impartial party, became necessary. This is what evolved to become the civil government system, as we know it today, with the judicial arm being simply one of its facets.
While during John Locke’s days there seemed to be the option to opt out of subjecting one’s self to the government system (with most parts of the world still largely ‘undiscovered’, in our current modern setting this is no longer optional. The modern man (and woman) has never really experienced at any point truly being in the ‘state of nature’, with the government system involved in our lives from birth. It can however be stated, that weighing everything, the benefits of being protected within a formal legal protection system largely outweigh whatever freedoms one may have in the natural state without a recognized legal machinery to protect us from the volatile whims of those around us.