Introduction

This tranfer report shall present my PhD research, its field, progress and the future plan. This report includes a short literature review around the topic under investigation in general and the the context of the genealogy of Burh?n al-?idd?q?n within the islamic philosophy miliue, the preliminary survey done so far from the mongraphs of Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra as well as some recent studies. As the research is still a work in progress, some sections are subject to revision and refinement in order to achieve the desired outcome of the entire PhD project.

The overll aim of this thesis is expound Mulla Sadra’s argument for the existence of god Burh?n al-?idd?q?n from his magnum opus al-?ikma al-Muta??liya f?-l-asf?r al-?aqliyya al-arba?a, for short ?sf?r and translate the relevant sections. The direct engagement with ?sf?r should come to fruition once the the language is demystified and relevant passages are explained. The uniqueness of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy demands a careful and thorough contemplation of ?sf?r. In addition, with reference to ?ikma al-Muta??liyas’ fundamental principles a complete picture could be drawn.

My research will shed some light on the history of Burh?n al-?idd?q?n; its principles has roots in al-Farabi’s and Ibn Sina’s peripatetic philosophy, than march towards the Philosophy of Mulla Sadra’s Hikma Muta’aliya, and expound the proof on the fundamental concept of primacy of existence ???lat al-W?j?d versus primacy of quiddity ???lat al-M?hiyyah. The concept of the primacy of existence and its modulation was scarcelly been discussed prior to Mulla ?adr?’s philosophy. This concept is the cornerstone in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, in-depth analysis is prerequisite in order for the proof to become into fruition.

Also, to demonstrate the differences between several versions of Burh?n al-?idd?q?n by focusing greatly on the four fundamental principles in Hikma Muta’aliya mentioned briefly in the following outline and how Mulla Sadra changed the course of the Burh?n al-?idd?q?n since then.

Research Context

The proposed study shall examine those arguments that have been put forward by Mulla Sadra (979/1570-1045/1635) for the proof of God, Burh?n al-?idd?q?n, and its prime premises; the primacy of Existence (a??l?t al wuj?d), modulation (tashk?k wuj?d), simplicity (ba?a?ah) and relational being (wuj?d al-r?bi?i).

Burh?n al-?idd?q?n is a famous argument considered by some philosophers as ontological argument for the existence of God. The term coined by Ab? Ali ibn Sina [370/980-428/1037] first introduced and dealt by him in Al-Ish?r?t, he expounded the argument based on the concept of possibility imk?n and necessity wuj?b and by doing so it could be argued that he initiated a new approach to the discussion of Burh?n al-?idd?q?n.

Unlike the teleological, cosmological and ontological arguments in the Kantian categorisation, the central point in the Burh?n al-?idd?q?n is that the existence of God is not proven through the mediation of any Quiddity m?hiyya (middle terms such as movement, creation, possibility, etc.), but rather through its mere Existence w?j?d . All mediating entities in Burh?n al-?idd?q?n are considered identical with god’s essence, such as reality (?aq?q?yya), existence (w?j?b), being (w?j?d), necessity (dar?r?), and so forth.

Al-F?r?bi, Prior to Ibn Sina, also engaged with the subject from the angle of possibility and necessity. Subsequently, over a period of time various versions of the Burh?n al-?idd?q?n were presented by Islamic philosophers. Suhraward? [549/1154-587/1191], and Mulla Sadra [979/1571-1050/1631-1635] are among the classical philosophers who, after F?r?b?, have articulated new versions of the argument. [1]

In recent times, Mirza Mahdi Ashtiyani [1888-1952] in his gloss on the ?har? al–Manz?mah of Sabzw?r? [2] , has enumerated nineteen different versions of Burh?n al-?idd?q?n. These nineteen versions of different arguments are those which have been put forward since the time of Mulla Sadra by the proponents of the school of Hikmah Muta’lya. Our discussion shall focus upon the writings of Ibn Sina’s on the Proof Burh?n al-?idd?q?n and the engagement of Mulla Sadra from the classical period and a recent past version by Mohammed Hussain ?ab???b?’? [d. 1982].

Traditionally, Islamic philosophers classified the arguments for existence of God according to the methodology of Demonstration (Burhan), which they followed, the two central categories are: One set of the proofs considers creatures as means for argument using the creature(s) as a middle termal-?add al-?wsat) in order to prove God’s existence, and this is known as Burh?n Al-Inni. However, in the other set of argument, creatures do not serve as means of proving God’s existence; rather they reach God through the very reality of existence, and this concept of existence is known as Burh?n al-limmi.[3]

Burh?n al-inni or Quia Demonstration is the first set of proofs, which is an inference from effect to cause, and the second set of proofs is Burh?n al-limmi or Propter Quid Demonstration, which is an inference from the cause to cause. However, recent islamic philosophers, for example for ?ab???b??, the partially inni demonstration is used in philosophical concepts because it is not possible to establish Propter Quid Burhan Limmi on God.[4] Burh?n al-?idd?q?n, the focus of this research, shall discuss in some details on the differences between these two proofs and the validity of ?ab???b??’s claim that it is impossible to have such a proof on the Gods existence. The etymology of ?idd?q?n (truthful) would be discussed, why Ibn Sina termed this proof as proof of truthful. Further, the relationship between the proof and the journeys of the wayfarer in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy should be discussed. The thesis will expound the intricacies from Mulla Sadra’s philosophy and translate the relevant chapters from ?sf?r. Burh?n al-?idd?q?n is an argument that understood from term al-haqq as used in Quran, in other words, to argue for the ?aqq in order to prove the existence of the al–?aqq, the Exalted. Only the term al-?aqq is used to substantiate God’s existence. Muslim philosophers have offered various facets of Burh?n al-?idd?q?n which shall be examined in details in this thesis.

Section 2: Literature Review

Ibn Sina on Burh?n al-?idd?q?n

Ibn Sina (Latinised as Avicenna) (370/980–429/1037) was the first philosopher to present the argument for the existence of God based on the notion of existence rather than motion, origination, causality or order/design which were the prevailing basis for the proof of God in Islamic philosophy and theology circus. A mature discussion of the concept of existence and contingency laid out in a succinct manner to establish, at the end of fourth Nama? of Ish?r?t, the final verdict by Ibn Sina on the proof of God which came to be known by him as the ‘Burh?n al-?idd?q?n’.

Following the establishment and negation of the sophist claim that nothing could be known or realised, the principles of contingency being and the necessary existence is established. Ibn Sina states that the existence is either necessary or contingent, the contingent by definition would need a determinant (murajih), however, if the determinant is himself a contingent in then again it would need another determinant to bring the thing (?ha?) into existence. Since the infinite regression of causes is impossible and avoid then, we must have a determinant what is not contingent. Further, the chain of contingent determinants does not make the chain necessary by itself because it’s absurd. Hence, we must have an external existence to the contingent chain which possesses existence necessarily. That necessary existent, according to Ibn Sina, is nothing but the God, the exalted.

Davidson, in his detailed treatment of Ibn Sina’s argument, claims that this proof for the existence of God is a cosmological proof, following the Kantian division of proofs into ontological, cosmological and teleological. Further, Ibn Sina ‘does not regard the analysis of the concept of necessarily existent by virtue of itself as sufficient to establish the actual existence of anything in the external world’ Davidson adds that Ibn Sina does not ‘wish to offer an a priori or ontological proof of the existence of God, but the rather a new form over the cosmological proof’[5].

For Kant[6], a Priory proposition and not empirical in nature are an Analytical judgement (A7-A8), accordingly Davidsons claim that Ibn Sina’s brokers cosmological and could not be said as ontology: is absurd since Ibn Sina’s principles I meant empirical and purely analytical. In Ish?r?t[7], Ibn Sins mistakes that ‘every existent, not looking at anything else, is either sets that existence is necessary for it in itself or it’s not. Though it could not be said that the opening paragraph of I?h?r?tis somehow posterior proposition ‘every existent’ but it will become clearer in the next fa?l that the existent for Ibn Sina is ‘mentally subjected dichotomy so the existence is either necessary or not. The move from necessary existence rendered as (w?jib al-w?j?d) expressed in religious terms as al-Haqq and al-Qayy?m. This explains evidently the ontological nature and reasoning of Ibn Sina’s argument for the existence of God.[8]

Hosseini[9] advocates that, by the Western tradition in the philosophy of religion, Ibn Sina’s argument is an ontological one, because it commences with a conceptual premise without any reference do the external world. To supplement that Ibn Sina’s argument is an ontological and not a cosmological, Morewedge[10], carried out and extensive analysis of Ibn Sina’s main texts, for example al-Shifa, Al-Najat and a less know text which was written in Farsi, D?nish N?meh, to demonstrate and defuse the claim that the argument is not an ontological one. For Morewedge, the discussion of ‘heavens and bodies is presented in an axiomatic way’ the ontological proofs presented in his earlier monographs are mainly on necessary being rather than as proofs for gods’ existence which are based specifically on his analysis of the concept of necessary and contingent beings[11].

Suhraward? and Burh?n al-?idd?q?n

Shah?b al-D?n Suhraward? b. 549/1123- k. 587/1191 was born in the village of Suhraward, now part of province of Zanjan, his philosophy well known in Arabic writing as ?ikmat al-shr?q, had an immense role in enriching the Islam?c intellectual and spiritual life and in particular his ideas left a significant impact on the philosophers who came subsequently particularly Mull? ?adr? and on his philosophy Hikm?t Muta’?liah – the transcendental wisdom. He studied philosophy and theology with Majid Al Din Al Jili d. in the city of Maraghah and than with the ??hir Al Din al-Maridini (d.594/1198) in the city of Isfahan, it is also known that ??hir al-F?ris? introduce al-Suhraward? to the Persian logician Umar b. Sahlan al-Sawadji who had a major impact on Suhraward?’s reformulation of his logical works[12], and introduced him to the Hellenistic philosophy_.

In addition to the influence of peripatetic philosophers, Suhraward? indebted to Hallaj whom he quotes in several passages and to al-Ghaz?l?’s mi?hk?t al-anw?r which played considerable role in shaping Suhraward?’s doctrine on relationship between the light to the Imam_. Furthermore, Suhraward? often cites ancient Persian Zoroastrians particularly in the knowledge of the angels and the symbolic language of light and darkness.

Suhraward? contemplate himself and the ?ikmat Ishraqi as renewal of perpetual wisdom al-?ikmat al-?aledah; the ancient traditions which were well-known in India, Persia, the Babylonians and the ancient Egyptians as well as in Athens in Plato’s time, he believes that the history of philosophy did not begin with Plato and Aristotle as is customary, but is concludes with them, and believed that Aristotle had curtailed wisdom by over shadowing the spiritual life with intellectual reasoning thus the wisdom could not flourish. The path to achieving Ishr?qi wisdom stations is of a typical Sufi tradition by way of asceticism and purification, following the Sharia’s and mastering the basic philosophical notions.

The basic principles of Illumination Philosophy can be summarized in the following points; the wisdom of the light is the foundational building block for Suhraward?’s philosophy, and the ultimate light of the lights is beyond comprehension who does not need to be defined as it is visible by itself and all other lights revealed by it. For light of lights n?r al-?nw?r is apparent in himself and in his absence darkness generated.

According to Suhraward?, all realities are composed of light and darkness; the absolute realism and unlimited is the Light of lights; and the 18,000 worlds that make up the universe is made up of light and darkness, the absolute truth and divine, the rest of the world are composed of light and darkness[13].

Although he never coined his proof of God as proof of truthful Burh?n al-?idd?q?n, Mulla Sadra brings along Suhraward?’s argument to support his concept of modulation of existence. Mulla Sadra asserts that his elucidation of Burh?n al-?idd?q?n approximates Suhraward?’s I?hr?q? tradition which is based on the principle of the light N?r, and the later philosophers did not comprehend Suhraward?’s fundamental principle of intensity and weaknesses in the true reality and existence since they have overlooked the premises of the proof or have shortcomings in the reasoning. The concept of the Light has modulation within itself and distinguishable from others by modulation in the light has led Mulla Sadra to take this concept and make it as a fundamentally Notion in his philosophy. N?r al-?nw?r for Suhraward? is the most complete entertain existent which is Single in essence and it’s not dependent on anything for its existence. All other existents are dependent and become reality by it. Since nothing constrains and opposes the light of lights n?r al-?nw?r, nothing can the render his sense void, therefore, he is eternal and self-dependent.

Al- Qa?sar? and Burh?n al-?idd?q?n

D?w?d Muhamad al-Qa?sar? d. [751/1350] was an student of ‘Abdul Raz?? K??h?n? Born in Kaisari in central Antonia, his introduction and gloss to the F?s?s al-?ikam of Ibn Arab? [d. 638], Qa?sar? outlines various arguments for the existence of God. Although Qa?sar?’s allegiance are toward the Sufi and mystique tradition of Ibn Arabi, his engagement with peripatetic school of though is evident. His introduction to F?s?s al-?ikam has various terms commonly used is philosophy of Ibn Sina. The first argument for the existence of god is based on the notion of necessary existence, for Qa?sar?, the existence is necessary by itself, because if it was otherwise it would have been a contingent being (mumkin), in other words, the contingent being requires a cause to bring him into existence, so if the necessary existence in not necessary by itself then it would necessitate him to be antecedent to itself which is absurd. The contingent beings for Qa?sar? are not real and mentally posited (i’tib?r?), it requires necessary being for their existence and external cause for their existence. Although contingent beings are not real and sheer mentally posited they require for their existence an external necessary being. In addition, the mentally posited existence does not become really beings (f? al-?h?r?j) except by necessary existence, so when the elimination (zaw?l) of the existence upon it the contingent is non-existent. Then if the existence is also mentally posited then the entire universe is mentally posited and that is absurd because quiddities are separated from existence which are as we said mentally posited. For Qa?sar?, the real Existence (?aq?q?) is what exists and the quiddities are mentally posited. This notion –the mentally posited existence- corroborates Mulla Sadra’s notion of quiddities which are given reality through existence and are sheer limits of the existence[14].

Mulla Sadra’s version of Burh?n al-?idd?q?n

Sadra presents another version of Burh?n al-?idd?q?n, which is based on the Primacy of existence, and says that this version of the proof ‘is more firm and elevated’ for the existence of God. He advocates the reality of existence and the impossibility of its non-existence. Likewise, he states that pure existence is free of any condition and limitation in its essence. Reality exists just because it exists, because of neither some assumptions nor something else. Therefore, the reality in its essence is equal to being independent of others, and it exists unconditionally. Moreover, it equals to eternal necessary being. Therefore, the reality of existence in its essence –and in itself without any conditions is equal to the eternal essence of God. Therefore, the priority of existence leads us directly to the eternal essence of God[15].

Unlike Mulla Sadra, the common point among various explanations and accounts presented by different philosophers in peripatetic school and I?hr?q? tradition regarding Burh?n al-?idd?q?n, is that all those who have offered their arguments have, somehow, attempted to establish the existence of the Necessary Exisitence by means of the concept of existence, however, the principles of the Transcendent Philosophy based on the primacy of existence, the modulation of existence, simplicity of existence, essential dependence of existence, neediness of the effect towards the cause. Given these principles, Mulla Sadra has presented a different account from his processors either Illumination or peripatetic tradition. Mulla Sadra considers Ibn Sina’s proof ‘merely reaches the conclusion that there must be something which is the Necessary Existent’[16] because the proof is based on the analysis of the existents and the need for cause for the contingents.

Mulla Sadra, the founder of Transcendental Philosophy, has given one of the finest explanations regarding Burh?n al-?idd?q?n which based on primacy of existence or wuj?d, which goes as follows: “the existent is either the reality of wuj?d or something else. What we mean by the “reality of wuj?d” is that which is not mixed with anything other than wuj?d, having neither limit, nor end, nor deficiency, nor generality, nor particularity; and it is called the Necessary Being. And we say: if the reality of wuj?d were not existent [by itself], then nothing would have existed; the consequent being evidently false, the subsequent is likewise false…therefore, it is evident that for all things the principle and the source of the act of existing are the pure reality of wuj?d, which is not mixed with anything other than wuj?d.”[17]

If existence, which according to the primacy of existence is principal and prime; it is needless of anything. Hence, what we were seeking is achieved and the Necessary Being is proven but if it is essentially needless, in this case it would be an effect and essentially in need of a being which is needless in essence because it is impossible for something that is dependent and needy in nature to take place or come into being without a completely independent and needless being[18].

Mulla Sadra bases his argumentation on various underlying principles to his philosophy in general Transcendental Philosophy Hikma Muta’aliya and the this exposition of the proof of the existence of God, these principles as follows:[19]

Principality of Existence versus Essence being mentally posited: for Mulla Sadra the existence is the prime reality and quiddity is nothing but a sheer manefestation of this reality. that is in the concrete external world no being has more than one reality; it is the intellect that extracts two concepts (quiddity and existence) from it. For instance, a human being does not have two external realities to be referred to, only the mind distinguishes these two distinct concepts of existence and quiddity, ‘the wujud of all contingent existents is their very quiddity in concerto and is united with it in some kind of unification’[20] It is only by the intellectual analysis that we see that quiddity and the particulars ( juze? ) of external things are different from its very existence.

The quiddity of the individual comes to our mind in the way it is in the external world, but its existence in the external world is very different from its mental existence. The effects and impacts of a thing (e.g. fire) has in the external world is different with it in the human mind. It becomes clear, thus, that existence wuj?d and mental existence or being wuj?d ?ihn?, are two separate concepts. It is only the existence that assists quiddity of being from non-existence; otherwise, quiddity by itself is nothing and has no external connection with anything. As the famous saying goes, ‘quiddity, by itself, is neither existent nor non-existent’; it is only itself m?h?yyah. Quiddity qua quiddity is incapable of making it into existence, and this issue makes it a mental posited i?tibar? and signifies the fact that it is merely an imitation/abstract ?ek?yah of the existence.[21]

Modulation of existence: Mulla Sadra is a steadfast and loyal proponent of gradation or modulation of existence (tashk?k al-wuj?d). Though the term modulation has been used in different context from the Greek philosophers to determine the differences in senses, however, Mulla ?adr? uses the term modulation the context of primacy of existence. It is the modulation and gradation in existence that we find differences in the world that is because after positing that that the existence is the prime reality and nothing exists outside the realm of existence; the difference occurs in the concreate world because of modulation of existence. To illustrate the concept further, existence is the only reality that can be manifested in the finite world, this manifestation is a demonstrated in hierarchy in different levels and in different degrees of perfection and deficiency, ‘ Gradation is characterisation of wuj?d, while mahiyyah cannot accept gradation.’[22]

The simplicity of existence: Existence is a simple reality that does not have a part and is not a part of something either because we do not have anything other than existence. Though it is a difficult doctrine to comprehend, yet, it is pivotal to Sadrian philosophy.[23] Mulla Sadra’s summarises the principle of simplicity by saying that ‘Every simple reality is, by virtue of of its unity, all things. It is not deprived of any of these things except by way of imperfection, privations and contingencies.’[24]

Effects are but aspects and manifestations of the cause: Cause, causality and effect are interrelated concepts that are not detachable from each other. According to Mulla Sadra, the effect by itself, because of natature being an effect, has no reality per se other than reliance and dependence on its cause, fuirthermore, the effect has no significance other than being an effect and subsistent, ‘the effect is a contigengt being, that is, neither existent nor non-existent, hense in need of a causet’[25] for it to become into existence. For the the absolutely originating cause has no essence and reality other than being the principle and source of everything and all relations and dependence because of it. Mulla Sadra considers the being of all things other than God to be connective being (wuj?d r?bi?) and only the Being of the God to be being per se (wuj?d mustaq?l).[26]

It is necessary to note in connection with the above explanation that studying the objects and beings around us help us prove the primacy of existence but they have no role in explaining the argument itself. That is because among the concomitants and benefits of the Burh?n al-?idd?q?n is that Mulla ?adr? do not use anything other than God the necessary existence for argumentation. The crux of this argument is the concept of primacy of existence and modulation of existence, hence the if the reality of existence is absolute and infinite then the point is proven, on the other hand, if the reality is finite and limited, it should depend on an absolute being for its existence; or on Necessary being. That is necessary being or God, the Exalted.

Mulla Had? Sabzw?r?

Sabzw?r?’s [1212/1797-1295/1878] philosophy stems from Mulla Sadra’s Transcendental Philosophy, he disseminated Mulla Sadra’s philosophy and commented on most of his treatise. Sabzw?r? presented two versions of proofs for the existence of God. His remarks on Mulla Sadra’s proof of Truthful in ?sf?r which considered by various scholars as a different proof to Mulla Sadra’s’. Allamah Tabatabei in Nihyat al–Hikmah introduces both proofs by Mulla Hadi Sabzw?r?’s comments on al-asf?r and on the gloss to his own philosophical poem in which he summarises the principles of transcendental wisdom. Based on the primacy of existence, the reality of existence is the essence (‘ayn) of concreate reality which cannot be non-existent; because the opposite is impossible for its adversity, and since existence cannot be non-existence then it is necessary existence by itself.

Sabzw?r?’s proof is firmly based on the principle of primacy of existence, the cornerstone of the transcendental philosophy, that is the external reality is identical to the existence (wuj?d) and quiddity is merely mental considerations (i’tib?r?) and limits and manifestations of the existence. The second principle that Sabzw?r? is basing his proof on is the principle of gradation of existence (tashk?k) is that existence is not a single level and homogenous but rather possesses many degrees of intensity and weaknesses as explained above.

The second argument presented by Sabzw?r?, on his own gloss on the philosophical poem .ghurar al ?ikam, here again commencing his argument by indicating that reality of existence, based on the primacy existence, is the only reality which all other realities becomes concrete by it and this reality is an un-bound reality or fridge it is impossible predicate non-existence. The emphasis on this argument is again on the primacy of existence enrich the hard reality has no other reality besides it, and has no Second reality outside it. In this version Sabzw?r? introduces the concept of unbound or non-delimited (?aqiqah Mursalah) which cannot become non-existent and it is the ultimate reality.

The key difference between the proof of truthful of Ibn Sina and transcendental philosophy is in the way the existence is conceived. while Ibn Sina’s dichotomising existence into necessary and contingency, Mulla Sadra consistently focusing on the sheer reality of existence as it is unbound and unrestricted. This a reality off existence has no other reality outside its on and has no second reality to it. All other realities are Grades and shadows of this reality. This non-delimited reality is so simple that has no limitations whatsoever, it is free from mental limitations, sorry it cannot be conceived, or any kind of logical limitations which requires definition therefore the existence has no definition. And of course has no material limitations so it is not a compound with any other concreate material. This un-restricted and un-bound reality gives reality with limitations to all quiddities. Quiddities comes into consideration by the real existence without this connection, the quiddities, could not be existed. If the unbound reality is limited then it would require an outside reality to complete its existence, but there is no other reality outside the existence, therefore necessary exists by itself.

Mohammed Hussain ?aba?ab?e? and Burh?n al-?idd?q?n

In the footnotes he made to the ?sf?r volume six and in his book The Principles of philosophy and the doctrine of Reality, ?aba?ab?e? outlined his exposition of the proof of Truthful. He bases his proof on the notion of the primacy of reality (w?qe’yyah), a term that had not previously been used in the Islamic philosophical learned community circle. According to Ubudeyat, ?aba?ab?e? proof going to be considered as a proof dispensing from providing proofs for gods’ existence. In other words, it is a new, complete and innovative proof from ?idd?q?n variety. It is worth quoting the passage in entirety to demonstrate the level of engagement with Mulla Sadra’s proof of Truthful Burh?n al-?idd?q?n.

‘And this the reality that is not deniable by sophistry. We find that all who are conscious are forced to affirm it. It cannot be nullified or its essence eliminated even if it is assumed to be null and eliminated, this implies its positive validation. Even if we suppose the nullity of all reality, at a time or absolutely, then all of reality would be really null (ie. Thias would be positive reality). Such [a supposition ] is dophistry. Even if you see things as illusory or doubted reality is real ( i.e., it is established with regard to it being the object eleminated). When the principle of reality does not admit nothingness or nullification in its essence, then it is eseencially necessary, so that it is essentially necessary reality; and things for which reality is improvished, their reality has dependent existence on it [i.e., on essentially necessary reality]. From this it is evident to those who contemplate, that the principle of the existence of the essencially necessary is required for man, and that positive proofs of it are admonitions to its truth’[27]

This proof is based on the following premises. First, the reality is not merely the universe, or what to we comprehend mentally, for example, universals and particulars. Reality for ?aba?ab?e? is what is affirmed even as one tries to deny it. Second, reality is not any kind of substance, primary or secondary, spiritualy or materialy. Thus the reality is what it is. Third the issue of causality or impossibility of infinite regression is not required to disproof in the argument. And finally, ?aba?ab?e? argument does not depend on any Hikmah Muta’alyyah principles for example, the primacy or simplicity of existence or the gradation within the reality of existence. The argument demands to look at the reality from different insight of Mulla Sadra’s reality of existence or Ibn Sina’s dichotomy of Necessary and Contingent axioms.

?Ubudiyyat (2010)[28], presents ?aba?ab?e?’s argument in the western analytical tradition;

There is an undeniable reality;
No existence of the reality equates net existence of the world and leads to pure sophism;
Non-existence of anything that is considered to be self-evident to our senses, conscious or sentiment, for example the soul and its states or other tangible things, in other words, the non-existence of contingents does not equate to pure non-existence, hence;
The aforementioned reality is not something we tend to think are self-evident because they are sensed or touched. Rather the aforementioned reality not anything from the contingencies;
Hence the reality is an unrestricted reality, immune to limitations and boundaries, furthermore this reality is not confined or restricted by any condition and boundary, and does not depend on any assumption;
That is because the assumption of non-existence of this reality is absurd;
this is possible the affair that the nonexistence of this a reality by itself – irrespective of an existence of anything else- requires existing of a thing, and denying it is affirming itself. And as we know from definition that:
we know accordingly that the eternal necessity or an essential necessity is the reality in which it is without any condition or limitation;
hence the aforementioned reality that is self-evidential reality which we adhered to in the proposition of the existence of some kind of reality, is eternal necessity and essential necessity.

?Ubudiyyat, reiterates ?aba?ab?e?’s footnotes to the ?sf?r that the proposition is not a proof for the existance of god, rather it’s a demonstration for the unbound reality (?aqiqah i?l?q?ah). For ?aba?ab?e?, Burh?n al-limmi or Propter Quid is not attainable for the existence of God, that is because His reality is self-evident, intuitive and it is known to all, rather what we need is only some sort of sign and remarks.

Jawadi Amuli elucidites ?aba?ab?e?’s argument from a different perspective. For him the proof does not entail any ph