Ethics in Criminal Justice

Psychologists, criminologists, and others who study criminal behavior have, for some time now, dedicated substantial attention to a certain subgroup of offenders: those often described in everyday language as the embodiment of evil. While we suggested in Chapter 2 that the majority of “evil” in the world results from well-intentioned people making poor choices as they go about their everyday activities, there remain inexplicable acts of harm and cruelty that can only be described as wicked acts of bad people. The label psychologists typically reserve for the worst of such people is that of the psychopath—those described by Robert Hare as “social predators . . . [c]ompletely lacking in conscience and in feelings for others, they selfishly take what they want and do as they please, violating social norms and expectations without the slightest sense of guilt or regret.”1

Fortunately, psychopaths are rare, accounting for only about 1 percent of the population, and up to 25 percent of jail and prison inmates,2 and news-making crimes commonly associated with psychopathic offenders, such as serial homicide and sadistic sexual assault, represent only a very small percentage of all criminal offenses. However, there is at least one important parallel between our moral evaluations of the heinous crimes of some psychopathic offenders and far more common instances of schoolyard bullying, callous property offending, or manipulative heartbreaking. In both kinds of cases, we tend not only to negatively assess the action, but also the person engaging in that action. We say not that the bully is a good person who made a poor choice or didn’t fully consider the consequences of his actions; rather, we are more apt to assume that the bully is a certain type of person—one with enduring personality characteris- tics that lead to him to consistently demonstrate selfish behavior patterns, disregard for the welfare of others, and so forth. For most, there is an important relationship between evil deeds and evil persons. Our discussion of normative ethics, then, must account not only for actions and consequences, but also for types of people.

In the previous two chapters, we explored normative ethical theories that concentrate on the con- sequences of our actions and on our actions themselves. Consequentialist ethics asks that we consider the results of our actions, with those that produce the greatest benefit (i.e., good consequences)—for oneself and/or others—being the “right” ethical choice in a given situation or with regard to a particular issue. Deontological ethics, in turn, asks that we consider relevant duties and principles, making choices and engaging in actions that are consistent with those duties and principles. What each has in common is an emphasis on doing. The overriding question of both types of theories is, “What should I do?”

Ethics, Crime, and Criminal Justice, Second Edition, by Christopher R. Williams and Bruce A. Arrigo. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2012 by Pearson Education, Inc.

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The importance of actions and consequences notwithstanding, what each of these types of theo- ries fails to consider is the types of people we should be. When we shift moral focus from our actions and their consequences toward the notion of good moral character, we begin asking ques- tions common to the third major tradition of normative ethics—that of virtue ethics.

Virtue ethics is the eldest of all ethical traditions, having its roots in the ancient Greek and Roman moral philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Epicureans, as well as a storied history in Eastern philosophical traditions such as Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism. Each of these philosophers and philosophical traditions shares an interest in examining what it means to lead a “good” life, with the “goodness” of our lives having much to do with the kinds of people that we are. In short, they are each concerned with our being virtuous people. The principal question asked and contemplated by the virtue tradition is, “What kind of person should I be?” Consequently, our goal or task as moral people is to develop into and continue to be that type of person; that is, to develop certain types of character traits (i.e., virtues), while seeking to “avoid or extinguish” others (i.e., vices).3 In this third and final chapter on normative ethics, we explore this eldest of all ethical traditions and the crucial questions it poses about what it means to be a moral person.

VIRTUE AND VICE

Think of the people that you most admire ethically—people that can and do commonly serve as ethical role models or after whom you pattern (or try to pattern) your own moral behavior. Now, consider if you will what all of those people have in common. Most likely, it is not that they were all skilled at considering the consequences of their actions. It is also probably not that they were steadfastly committed to certain ethical imperatives and always placed their duty to abide by certain moral laws above all else. While they may have demonstrated one or both of these quali- ties, it is more likely that what they all have in common is that they are all certain types of people. Perhaps the people that came to mind are historical figures such as Jesus, the Buddha, Mother Teresa, or Martin Luther King Jr.; perhaps they are parents, family, friends, or teachers. In any case, what the people we most admire as exemplars of moral goodness seem to share is usually not so much about what they do, but the types of people they are. They tend to be caring people, compassionate, forgiving, merciful, respectful, and considerate of the needs and interests of others. In short, when we think of ethical or moral people, we probably think of what moral philosophers would call virtuous people.

Virtue and Character

When we talk about the types of people that we or others are, we usually do so in terms of character traits. A character trait is “a tendency to behave in certain ways in certain circumstances.”4 Character traits can dispose us toward moral or immoral behaviors; they can encourage us to be honest, responsible, and considerate of the needs and interests of others, or incline us to be dishonest, decep- tive, fraudulent, irresponsible, or indifferent to or harmful toward others. What is important about character traits is not only that they define us as people, but that they dispose us to act in certain ways when we encounter certain types of situations.

When taken together, character traits define a person’s character. By character, we mean a collection—a “cluster, or perhaps system”—of character traits as they appear in a given person.5 Thus, a person who possesses the individual traits of honesty, integrity, humility, and self-respect possesses an overall character that is constituted by these dispositions. Ultimately, as we will see, being a “good” or virtuous person requires more than simply possessing a few

Chapter 10 • The Virtuous and the Vicious: Considering Character 189

Ethics, Crime, and Criminal Justice, Second Edition, by Christopher R. Williams and Bruce A. Arrigo. Published by Prentice Hall. Copyright © 2012 by Pearson Education, Inc.

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190 Part 3 • Normative Ethics: Theory and Application

individual character traits; rather, it is about possessing a collection of traits that work together to generate a moral character that is typified by its collective “goodness” (see Box 10.1).

While it is common in everyday language to refer to “character traits,” moral philosophers have historically used the more specific terms virtue and vice to refer to traits of character that are regarded as “good” or “bad” in moral contexts. Good character traits such as honesty and integrity are considered moral virtues, while traits such as selfishness and arrogance are regarded as moral vices. Most generally, then, moral virtues are traits of character that dispose a person to act in a moral fashion, while moral vices are traits of character that dispose a person to act in an indifferent or harmful fashion. In the remainder of our discussion of moral character, we will typically use the terms “moral virtues” and “moral vices” rather than the more generic term “character traits.” Here are but a few character traits that are widely regarded as virtues:6

Benevolence Compassion Courage Faithfulness Generosity Gratitude Honesty Humility Integrity Justice Kindness Loyalty Mercifulness Modesty Nonharm Open-mindedness Patience Politeness Prudence Reliability Responsibility Self-control Self-respect Sincerity Tactfulness Tolerance Trustworthiness Unselfishness Wisdom