Environmental Ethics
Few would deny that there exists a difference between animals and humans these differences are scientific objectivities
examinable by biology and psychology. If it is agreed that we can establish a distinction between animals and humans
should we not, therefore be able to establish a distinction in how they are morally valued and ethically considered?
In considering the topic of animal moral status this week, I have decided that it is easier and perhaps better, however, to
consider the issue from a perspective not of differences but of similarities instead. In combing through the assigned
readings for the week I have kept these similarities in mind. As a self-proclaimed animal lover, I am inclined to believe
that animals warrant moral standing and ethical consideration but how much, to what degree and under what circumstances is
harder to articulate. The views of Immanuel Kant have always seemed to me too machinistic and clinical reminiscent of
Descartes theories that animals are governed by the laws of matter alone (Harrison, 1992). But, as states Wilson (2012),
Kants views are more positive than usually assumed and they do draw parallels between humans and animals based on their
intrinsic purposiveness (p.62). Ultimately, however, Wilson (2012) concludes that Kant does not find animals morally
considerable and calls for their respect and proper treatment only out of respect for our own humanity.
This argument reminds me of the reading by Thomas Hill (2012/1983) that questioned if the willingness to indulge in certain
acts (whether or not they are accepted as morally wrong) reveals an absence in what is a preconceived notion of human
excellence. Essentially putting the onus on humans a little like Kant.
Although I found myself agreeing with Hill, I felt there was more to a nature ethic.
In the same way, I feel there is more to animal moral consideration. Animals exist apart from human culture and as such, in
weighing their ethical consideration, one must move away from culturally based ethics (Rolston, 1998/2012). Mark Bekoff, in
his book, The Animal Manifesto (2010), uses the term speciesism to describe the attitude that allows us to mistreat animals
and to fail to give them moral consideration. Singer (1976/2012) also discusses speciesism and makes the distinction that
equality of consideration is not synonymous with equal rights. In Singers opinion, animals are deserving of equal
consideration as beings capable of suffering yet the fundamental differences between animals and humans means that they can
still be morally less important than humans (p.74).
Singer says it is the ability to suffer that makes animals worthy of moral consideration but Regan (1985/2012) stipulates
the inherent value of all beings and states we are each of us the experiencing subject of a life, each of us a conscious
creature having an individual welfare that has importance to us whatever our usefulness to others (p.89).
It is my feeling that every being has an interest in existing and this interest must be equally considered. Although
animals may not have a sense of self or future they are sentient beings. Evidently, there are many different opinions on
what the eligibility criteria are for being morally considerable. Is it rationale thought, as believed Kant? Is it the
ability to suffer? Is it instead the mere fact of existing? Once we determine these grounds, how then do we determine are
they equal to humans? Is the moral value they possess less than that of humans? If so, how? Regan ( 1985/2012) argues that
it would be difficult to defend this position given that many humans are deficient in the very things we deem more morally
valuable (i.e. intellect, autonomy, etc.). After all, how can there be degrees of inherent value? All who have value have
it equally, right? (p. 89).
It is important for us as a community of humans to articulate our beliefs because only then can we change our habits and
extend this ethic to all. An ethic for animals is only one concern in a larger more comprehensive environmental ethic.