The potential to cause faster increase in illness and deaths than almost any other natural health threat exists in an influenza pandemic. Preparedness and planning at the interpandemic period (before the strike) is essential for operational response efficiency (Brown, 2000). This article describes a planned strategy to respond and prepare for a possible influenza pandemic attack. It also offers direction to local, federal, state, tribal, and international health departments and agencies as the primary target to enhance preparation and planning, at the level where the main response activities start. The plan offers for coordination of activities among the federal government, health care provider facilities, private businesses, charitable organizations among other agencies of states government.
Intent of the plan
The purpose of the preparations and response plan is to provide for the State, federal, private sector, local, and non-government entities a framework to work together to reduce the mortality, influenza-morbidity and social disruption which would result from a disease outbreak (Uhernik & Husson, 2009). The plan describes the incident management concepts, activities, and structure that the State will operate during an influenza outbreak and the activities, responsibilities and roles that apply to control and command staff. Other objectives of the project include:
Goals and Objectives the Plan
The Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan main goal is to limit mortality and morbidity of influenza and its complications during a decrease social disruption, pandemic and economic loss (Bynner, 2000).
Planning assumptions
Prevention and Preparedness
In planning the main aim of prevention and preparedness are to:
Response
While the response actions continue to be implemented, recovery operations may start. The goals of response actions are to
Recovery
The operations of recovery may function concurrently with the response action. The main operational goals include:
Plan Development and Maintenance
The entire preparedness and response plan is reviewed and revised yearly by the (DPH) department of health office of preparedness and response. The DPH office will collaborate with other divisions, offices, and programs to ensure continued applicability of the organizations and agencies listed in the plan to review their responsibilities and roles and change as necessary (Kok, et al., 2010).
Planning and Coordination
The EMA (Emergency management agencies) and DPH department directors will jointly establish a multi-agency, multijurisdictional committee responsible for developing recommendations for improving pandemic influenza response and preparedness within the State. The members at a minimum will include representatives from the Governors office, EMA, DPH, hospitals, local health departments and infection control practitioners, appropriate non-governmental and private sector organizations and local emergency management agencies (Silver & Fischhoff, 2011).
Preparedness
Different stakeholders have important roles in pandemic influenza response and preparedness. Stakeholders include agencies, federal departments, state and local health departments, public health organizations, laboratories, influenza vaccine and antiviral manufacturers, private health care organizations, vaccinators and vaccine distributors.
Not all parts of the plan will be relevant immediately to each of the stakeholders. The purpose of the organizing committee is to compile into a single program the guidelines with the aim of enhancing improvement and understanding between private and public sectors and at different levels of the health care system. This guideline also stresses that an effective response requires infrastructure, planning, and action at many levels and by different groups.
This structure also emphasizes that an effective response to an influenza pandemic requires planning, infrastructure, and action at many levels and by many groups. Precautions, travel advisories and screen shots of people arriving from affected areas, restricting public gathering, closing schools, and quarantine of exposed people may be necessary steps for mitigating transmission, and different authority departments can get entrusted with handling this aspect. These interventions applications are based on the evolving patterns of the epidemic epidemiology (Kok et al., 2010).
Inter-pandemic phase of the pandemic
This inter-pandemic phase of the pandemic is subdivided into 4 main levels. The first category is level zero that has no identification of an influenza-causing strand in human anatomy, therefore, poses no threat. Level one has a case alert of possible human infection by the virus strain. Level two has no documented person transition and unclear cause of outbreaks, but has two or more speculated cases of infection outbreaks. Level three is the pandemic alert level with an outbreak in one country and people spread in the community for more than two weeks (World Health Organization, 2006).
Transition from a virus alert to an epidemic level is followed by response activities that involve heightened global and local surveillance. These responses include virology and epidemiology investigation of a novel influenza strain, including international cooperation with global stakeholders on vaccine development, containment, and clinical testing. That leads towards licensing of pandemic vaccine, activation of local plans and coordination, and communication strategy implementation that educate the public and health care providers (Silver & Fischhoff, 2011).
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
The pandemic influenza response will use much the same infrastructure as that needed for response to any public health emergency. However, many areas are specific to pandemic influenza and thus need specific considerations. Following are six operational considerations of the plan;
Epidemiologic Investigation
The health care departments and DPH during the epidemiology phase tries to:
Relevance of the Pandemic Influenza Response and Preparedness Plan
The plan mainly aims to limit and sustain the spread of an influenza pandemic and cushion the impact it has on the economy, sustain infrastructure and reduce social disruptions. It offers the state government’s executive branch with a set of response functions, preparedness activities and provides health care provider systems, local health departments, and first-responder organizations with response and preparedness expectations. When applicable non-governmental, federal, private enterprises and citizens roles are suggested (Bynner, 2000).
The reaction and mitigation plan is supposed to be implemented within the framework of a unified command emergency operating structure involving representations from federal, state, and local governments. The process will work under the leadership and monitoring of the office of the Governor, with the collaboration from different emergency management agencies (Brown, 2000). The structure allocates roles to state agencies. The maintenance of the project involves a yearly analysis by the responsible stakeholders and agencies, managed by the Department of Health.
Effective Pandemic Response Coordination
In an influenza attack, a national crisis is present, and it will need State governments role in the event of the epidemic that is to monitor the spread of the infection closely. Rapidly gather and deploy material to assist the efforts of the local government in dealing with the expected increase demands and widespread of the illness on most essential government services. Due to the expected characteristics associated with epidemics, the federal and state government is likely to become involved with providing guidance, assistance, and leadership almost immediately following such developments.
Overall control and direction of authority resides with the Office of the Governor, with management and coordination expertise supplied by (EMA) Emergency management agencies. The department of health will also assume a central response role during an influenza outbreak, based on the statutory and expertise authorities over many medical and health issues. The plan involves lines of succession for both the department of health director and governor.
Emergency Response Notification and Activation Procedures
Public and medical health authorities may detect the first human case of the virus spread through the laboratory and clinical evaluation of persons presenting with the upper respiratory disease or illness. The EMA receives updated national surveillance from CDC (center for disease control) through the health care units. The CDC analyses these monitoring recommendations, offers any necessary revisions and technical clarification for application to State, and distributes recommendations to medical providers, local health departments, and hospital. based infection control practitioners through email and other Health Alert networks. Local health departments distribute recommendations to health alert networks and individual physicians or their own emergency communication mechanisms.