Denial/Deception

Abstract

Second World War history offers the military strategist a cornucopia of lessons learned on how to apply the art of mili ­ tary deception. This paper analyzed six Allied deception opera ­ tions to identify the fundamental reasons why Allied deception efforts were the most successful in history. The six deception operations reviewed were Barclay, Cockade, and Bodyguard as well as the Soviet deception operations at Stalingrad, Kursk, and White Russia. A critical analysis of these six operations identified seven major factors that made Allied deception efforts extremely effective. These seven factors were that the Allies controlled all key channels of information, had great intelli ­ gence “feedback” on their deception operations, had high-level and centralized control over deception planning, practiced sound deception techniques, subordinated deception to strate­ gic and operational objectives, maintained adequate secrecy, and provided sufficient time for deception execution. These fac ­ tors are relevant for today’s operations and should be imbedded within US doctrine.

This study then examined Joint Publication 3-58, Joint Doc­ trine for Military Deception, and determined it could better in­ corporate the lessons learned from World War II. Current joint doctrine could be improved by underscoring the contribution that deception provides to surprise, the importance of integrat ­ ing deception within all three levels of war, and the importance of exploiting an adversary’s preexisting beliefs when creating a deception story. Applying these World War II lessons will bol ­ ster US deception capabilities.

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Second World War Deception: Lessons Learned for Today’s Joint Planner

Military deception is the art of misleading the enemy into doing something, or not doing something, so that his strategic or tactical position will be weakened.

—Charles Cruickshank

The German high command delayed the transfer of the fighter force to France because for a time it believed Normandy was a feint.

—Adolf Galland

Deception Operations in the Second World War

Military deception has always played a vital role in warfare and will continue to do so as long as mankind has a propen ­ sity to wage war. Sun Tzu alluded to this role more than 2,500 years ago when he stated that all “war is based on deception.”1 The importance of deception has surely not di ­ minished over the millennia and, in fact, may be gaining in importance. With declining defense budgets, shrinking force structures, growing costs of high technology, and increasing reluctance to risk human life, today’s military strategists and planners should be studying and applying deception with a renewed and heightened vigor. Military deception is a proven force multiplier that can shape the battlefield by providing surprise and security for military operations and forces. Thus, deception enables the joint force commander (JFC) to more quickly achieve mission objectives and to do so at a lower cost in casualties and resources—or in other words, deception al­ lows the JFC to do more with less.

A study of the Second World War offers the military strategist a cornucopia of historical examples and lessons learned for applying the art of military deception. Military deception was successfully planned and executed by the Allies on a worldwide basis in support of decisive military campaigns. 2 The Allies, particularly in the European theater, used deception in every major joint campaign. The three main Allies—Great Britain, United States, and the Soviet Union—all started the war with unfledged deception concepts and ended the war with sophisti ­

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cated and perfected deception programs. The trials and errors of Allied deception and its maturation are well recorded in his ­ tory and should be a focal point for any analysis of military deception.

This research project analyzed six large Allied deception op ­ erations to identify the fundamental reasons why Allied decep ­ tion efforts were the most successful in history. This analysis reviewed the British and American Operations Barclay, Cock ­ ade, and Bodyguard along with the Soviet deception operations in the battles of Stalingrad, Kursk, and White Russia (the 1944 summer offensive). This review provided the foundation for this research project.

A critical analysis of these six deception operations identified seven major factors that made Allied deception efforts extremely effective. These seven factors were that the Allies controlled all key channels of information, had superior intelligence “feed ­ back” on deception operations, had high-level and centralized control over deception, practiced sound deception techniques, subordinated deception to strategic and operational objectives, maintained adequate secrecy, and provided sufficient time for deception execution. These seven factors made Allied deception successful, and they still have relevance for today’s deception planners.

Since these factors are still relevant, this study then reviewed Joint Publication (Pub) 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Decep­ tion, and found that, although the joint doctrine somewhat reflected the seven factors, it did so insufficiently. This research showed that the joint publication could be improved by under ­ scoring the contribution that deception provides to achieving surprise, the importance of integrating deception within all three levels of war, and the importance of exploiting an adver ­ sary’s preexisting beliefs when creating a deception story. These three aspects were clearly critical to Allied deception operations and are reflected in the seven factors that are reviewed in detail later in this study.

In short, this research highlighted the important role that deception played in World War II and the emphasis that decep ­ tion should continue to receive today. Allied deception efforts during the Second World War significantly helped the Allies gain a decisive victory over Nazi Germany and at a reduced cost in casualties. Deception can have the same impact for today’s

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operations if the lessons of the past are applied. For Winston Churchill’s admonition that “in wartime, the truth is so pre ­ cious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies” is still undeniably true.3

All critical analysis should start by reviewing the facts. Therefore, the next section provides a concise review of six major deception operations conducted by the Allies and sum ­ marizes their results. This review provides the foundation for analyzing Allied deception efforts.

Allied Deception Operations

The Allies extensively employed deception against Germany and Italy during the Second World War. The primary goals of Allied deception were to gain surprise for offensive operations and to provide increased security for forces by masking military objectives, planning, preparations, and operations. These de ­ ception efforts were most notable in Operations Barclay, Cock ­ ade, and Bodyguard as well as in Soviet deception operations at Stalingrad, Kursk, and White Russia.

Operation Barclay—1943. Operation Barclay was designed to mask Operation Husky—the Allied invasion of Sicily. Barclay called for sham attacks on southern France and the Balkans, to include Greece and Crete. Barclay was designed to achieve sur ­ prise for the Husky invasion force and to cause the Germans to misallocate their resources so they would not strengthen their defenses in Sicily before and after the actual invasion. Further ­ more, Barclay was intended to keep the Italian fleet in the Adriatic Sea close to the Balkans and away from Sicily. To do this, the Allies created a sham army in the eastern Mediterra ­ nean, called the Twelfth Army, which consisted of 12 fictitious divisions.4 This deception exploited Hitler’s preexisting fears, for he often suspected the Allies would invade Europe through the Balkans.5 The Allies spread this deception story through the use of double agents, false communications, dummy encamp ­ ments, recruiting of Greek interpreters, and collection of Greek and French maps and currencies.6

Operation Mincemeat. Operation Mincemeat was carried out in conjunction with Barclay. Mincemeat involved the plant ­ ing of a dead body off the coast of Spain. The corpse appeared to be that of a courier who apparently had fallen from an Allied ship and drowned. More importantly, a briefcase, which was

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attached to the body, contained documents detailing Allied plans to invade Europe through Greece. Interestingly, and no doubt deliberately, the fake plan to invade Greece was also called Husky. After finding the body, the Spanish authorities forwarded copies of the “secret” documents to the Germans. According to Ultra, which was intelligence gained from the deci ­ phering of German Enigma radio communications, Hitler and other senior German leaders believed the story and made preparations to defend Greece. Fremde Heere West (FHW), the German intelligence department that focused on western threats, called the apparent intelligence coup “absolutely con ­ vincing.” Sir Michael Howard, the renowned British historian, claimed that Mincemeat was “perhaps the most successful de ­ ception operation in the war.”7

Results of Barclay and Mincemeat. Operations Barclay and, its supporting plan, Mincemeat were very successful. First, the Allies gained total surprise against both the Ger ­ mans and the Italians when they invaded Sicily. Second, the Germans misallocated their defenses by bolstering their ground forces in the Balkans from eight to 18 divi ­ sions—valuable assets that could have been better used in Sicily and Italy. Third, because of deception efforts, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), the German armed forces high command, had overestimated by 100 percent the number of Allied divisions in the eastern Mediterranean. This inaccurate order of battle lent credence to the German as ­ sessment that the Allies were going to invade through the Balkans. Of note, the OKW believed this exaggerated order of battle through the remainder of the war, simplifying future Allied deception efforts in the Mediterranean. 8

Operation Cockade—1943. Operation Cockade was a series of deception operations designed to alleviate German pressure on Allied operations in Sicily and on the Soviets on the eastern front by feinting various attacks into western Europe. Addition ­ ally, the Allies hoped to use Cockade to bait the Luftwaffe into a massive air battle with the Metropolitan Royal Air Force and US Eighth Air Force that would enable the Allies to gain air supe ­ riority over western Europe. Cockade involved three subordi ­ nate deception operations: Starkey, Wadham, and Tindall. Op ­ eration Starkey was to occur in early September, Operation Tindall in middle September, and Operation Wadham in late

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September—all in 1943. The three deception plans were inter ­ woven into one large deception story. 9 The Allies sent the Cock­ ade story to the Germans by using double agents, decoy sig ­ nals, fake troop concentrations, and increased reconnaissance and bombing missions into the areas of Boulogne, Brest, and Norway.10

Operation Starkey involved a sham British and Canadian amphibious invasion into the Boulogne, France, area. For the Americans, the original Starkey deception plan involved 2,300 heavy bomber, 3,700 fighter, and four hundred medium bomb ­ er sorties to strike targets near Boulogne with the goal of con ­ vincing the Germans that the British and Canadian invasion preparations were authentic.11 Additionally, the British were to provide another three thousand heavy bomber sorties into the Boulogne area.12 Starkey was to culminate with a large feint involving sailing an amphibious force, consisting of 30 ships, off the Boulogne coast, hoping to lure in the Luftwaffe.

The Starkey plan encountered difficulties from the start. Maj Gen Ira C. Eaker, Eighth Air Force commander, criticized Starkey by saying that the plan would force the Americans to abandon their strategic bombing offensive. In a letter to Su ­ preme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), Eaker said Starkey called for 2,300 heavy bomber sorties over 14 days “when the command had only flown 5,356 combat sorties in the past 8 months.” 13 Although Eaker convinced SHAEF to lower the American commitment to three hundred heavy bomber sorties, he promised to provide as many bomber sorties as possible from newly organized bomber units undergo ­ ing training. When it was over, Eighth Air Force had flown a total of 1,841 bomber sorties. Other problems were encoun ­ tered as well. Headquarters, VIII Air Support Command noted that Starkey planners had a difficult time agreeing on the rules of engagement for striking targets in occupied France. Addition ­ ally, the British and Americans unwittingly duplicated efforts on several occasions by flying the same missions within a few days of each other.14 The Royal Navy (RN) did not fully endorse the deception plan either. Starkey planners had wanted to place two RN battleships within the amphibious force to act as “cheese in the mouse trap” for the Luftwaffe. The RN was un ­ willing to risk its battleships in such a manner. 15 In short, the

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Starkey planners had to make several amendments to the de ­ ception plan.

Planners for Operation Wadham wanted the Germans to be ­ lieve that the Americans were going to invade in the area of Brest, France. This story, which was totally fictional and in ­ volved minimal “real” forces, had an amphibious group sailing directly from the United States and another force from Great Britain—13 divisions in all—to conduct an invasion at Brest. 16

The premise of this story was that the Americans were planning to invade Brest following the successful invasion at Boulogne. Although the air commitment for this plan was considerably less than Starkey’s, Eaker also criticized Wadham by saying that the combined bomber offensive would provide more effec ­ tiveness at destroying the Luftwaffe than the diverted bomber resources could provide in support of Wadham. 17 Other than air assets, the Americans only had to provide 75 dummy landing craft to aid in the deception effort. 18 The primary weakness in Wadham’s story was that the US forces were going to land outside of Allied tactical air support range. Prior to the opera ­ tion, the Army Operations Branch called Wadham a “very weak plan,” but “essential as a part of COCKADE to reinforce STARKEY.”19

Operation Tindall involved the story that the British and Americans were going to attack Norway, with the hypothetical goal of capturing Stavanger and its airfield. Stavanger and its airfield were critical to the story, for once again the Allies were planning a deception operation outside of tactical air support range and needed a way to increase the plausibility of the plan.20 The five divisions that were to be used in the sham invasion were actual divisions camped in Scotland. Addition ­ ally, the Allies had adequate aircraft and naval assets in Scot ­ land to make the deception plan plausible. The only “shortfall” the Allies had with Tindall was their lack of gliders. 21 The Allies hoped Tindall would induce the Germans to maintain the 12 divisions they had assigned to Norway. 22

Results of Cockade. Operation Cockade failed to achieve its objectives. German leadership did not believe the Allies were going to invade western Europe in 1943, and Cockade did not trigger the air battle the Allies desired. 23 The main exception was Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, the com ­ mander in chief of Western Command, who believed the Allies

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were going to invade at Boulogne and was angry at the German high command for removing 10 divisions from France. 24 The invasion stories, particularly Starkey and Wadham, were not plausible and lacked credibility. There were no significant Ger ­ man reactions to these deception operations, to include a lack of air reconnaissance and neither a naval nor Luftwaffe re ­ sponse to the Starkey amphibious feint. 25 The fact the Germans moved 10 divisions out of northern France to other theaters indicated that Starkey and Wadham were abject failures. 26 In Norway, the Germans did keep force levels at 12 divisions, indicating the Germans assessed a higher threat there. 27 Be­ sides being implausible, Cockade also failed because the Allies expended inadequate resources in making the deception look real. As noted earlier, the Royal Navy did not want to risk its battleships, and Eaker did not want to divert resources from the strategic bombing offensive.28 Cockade did have one suc­ cess: the Germans believed the story that the Allies had 51 divisions in the British Isles, when in reality there were only 17 divisions. This became a factor for deception operations in 1944. Overall, however, Cockade was best summarized by Sir Arthur “Bomber” Harris, commander of the British Bomber Command, when he said the deception plan was “at best a piece of harmless play acting.”29

Operation Bodyguard—1944. Operation Bodyguard was the deception plan that supported the Normandy invasion—Opera ­ tion Overlord. The Bodyguard objective, which was specified in the initial plan dated 20 January 1944, was to induce Germany to make “faulty strategic dispositions” before Operations Over ­ lord and Anvil. The deception planners wanted the Germans to misallocate their resources by inducing them to reinforce northern Italy, the Balkans, Greece, and Scandinavia. 30 Body­ guard consisted of three primary operations—Zeppelin, Forti ­ tude North, and Fortitude South—and numerous secondary op ­ erations.

Operation Zeppelin. Zeppelin involved a sham attack in the Balkans by British and American forces encamped in northern Africa. The goal was to induce the Germans to maintain a large defensive presence in the Balkans to prevent reinforcements into northern France. The Allies accomplished this objective by increasing the number of decoy landing craft in the eastern Mediterranean and by convincing the Germans that the Allies

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had 39 divisions available to invade the Balkans. In reality, there were only 18 divisions in the theater. Hitler acknowledged this threat on 8 May when he referred to the proven “presence of battle-strength enemy divisions in Egypt.” The sham called for the fictional British Twelfth Army to attack Greece and the real American Seventh Army to attack Yugoslavia. The Allies primarily used five double agents to transmit this story. 31 Zep­ pelin also entailed cooperation with the Soviets. The Soviets were to conduct amphibious feints towards Romania and Bul ­ garia that were to be timed in conjunction with the sham Brit ­ ish and American invasion in the Balkans. 32

Operation Fortitude North. Fortitude North involved a sham attack on Norway. The story was that the western Allies were going to attack Norway in the spring of 1944 with the goal of gaining an early lodgment in Denmark. As part of this story, the Allies created a fictional Fourth Army in Scotland that con ­ tained three corps with 250,000 troops—eight divisions over ­ all.33 One corps, the fictitious British VII Corps, was to capture Narvik while the other two corps, the British II Corps and the US XV Corps, were to capture Stavanger. To transmit this story to the Germans, the Allies used numerous double agents, false radio nets, and decoy camps. The Soviets colluded by faking offensive preparations aimed at Finland and northern Norway. 34

Additionally, Fortitude North was supported by Operation Graffham which involved using diplomatic pressure to gain over-flight rights and logistics support from Sweden. The Allies hoped that Sweden would leak these initiatives to Germany, thereby inducing the Nazis into thinking that future Allied op ­ erations were likely in Scandinavia. Both FHW and OKW as ­ sessed the threat to Norway as “credible.” 35

Operation Fortitude South. Fortitude South was a two­ phase deception plan centered on the Pas de Calais area. The first phase was intended to induce the Germans into thinking the main attack was going to occur in the Pas de Calais area, and not in Normandy, and that the invasion was going to occur in late July. The second phase, designed to start after Overlord, had the goal of convincing the Germans that the Normandy invasion was just a feint to draw in German reserves in prepa ­ ration for the main effort that was going to occur in the Pas de Calais region.36 The Allies created a fictional army group, called the First United States Army Group (FUSAG), and placed it