a. Traditional theories of judicial review hold that neutral
or
principled grounds are the only legitimate bases for judicial decisions
and reject political motives in judicial decision-making. Do you believe
this is true? Do you see principled v. political motives in important
U.S. Supreme Court constitutional decisions which overturn laws passed
by legislatures (such as restrictions on gun ownership, or marijuana
use)?
b. Interestingly, those behind high-profile cases brought to the
court are often those who seek political agendas. In Korea, they defer
to the Korean Constitutional Court when a political deadlock is reached
(and they were unwilling or unable to settle contentious public disputes
in the legislature). Politicians may invite judicial intervention
deliberately to avoid public criticism of their incapability of action
and to divert responsibility to the Court. Do you think this is true in
the United States? If so, can you provide a specific example?
c. When people cannot get decisive action from their political
leaders, they are very likely to turn to courts and judges instead. That
is, when any political group cannot gain electoral support enough to be
a dominant ruling party or coalition, the court becomes perceived as
the most reliable civil institution in the country. In controversial
cases, such as gun ownership rights or marijuana use in the U.S., do you
see similarities or differences from this trend occurring?
d. Judicial review is a double-edged sword. If exercised
courageously, but prudently, to defend the rights of those politically
and economically disadvantaged or hold the line against abuses of power.
On the other hand, judicial review can easily become a formidable
instrument for legitimating the interests of existing political and
economic elites. Can you provide examples of cases where the U.S.
Supreme Court, like the court in Korea, attempted to walk the line
between government power and the rights of individuals without that
power?