What is the future for peace?
We have been exposed to a wide range of literature on peace. As you look into the future, what are the most promising aspects of peace research, and what leaves you the most pessimistic? Please be sure to reference literature from the course in building your answer.
Lesson Objectives:
• Analyze how approaches to peace have changed through time in response to changes in the international system.

• Distinguish among approaches to peace based on their level of analysis: the individual, state/society, and interstate.

• Evaluate the efforts of regional and global intergovernmental organizations in ending violent conflict.

The following activities and assessments need to be completed this week:
• Reading:
• Barnett, Michael. 2006. Building a republican peace: stabilizing states after war. International Security 30, no. 4: 87–112.
• Gowan, Richard. 2011. Floating down the river of history: Ban Ki-moon and peacekeeping, 2007-2011. Global Governance 17: 399-416.
• Suhrke, Astri. 2011. Virtues of a narrow mission: the UN peace operation in Nepal. Global Governance 17: 37-55.
• Tanner, Fred. 2010. Addressing the perils of peace operations: toward a global peacekeeping system. Global Governance 16: 209-217.
• Tryggestad, Torunn L. 2010. The UN peacebuilding commission and gender: a case of norm reinforcement. International Peacekeeping 17, no. 2: 159-171.
• Wesley, Michael. 2008. The state of the art on the art of state building. Global Governance 14: 369-385.
Approaches to Peace: The Future
Lesson
Looking for Peace
As we look forward to the future of approaches to peace, a number of issues jump out. First, an emphasis on state building appears to be here to stay at least for the next few years at a minimum. The threat of failed states in a globalized world appears too dangerous for world powers to ignore (Wesley 2008). Second, peacebuilding as practiced by Western dominated international organizations will almost certainly continue to be liberal peacebuilding that focuses on the rule of law, markets, and democracy (Barnett 2006). Third, the Right to Protect doctrine will continue to be inconsistently applied at the interests of major powers (Falk 2011).

Approaches

Wesley (2008) notes four developments that encouraged the international shift toward state building. First, key international actors began to argue that the inviolability of sovereignty could no longer be considered unconditional, but rather sovereignty is “conditional on the discharge of certain responsibilities by the state and the international community has a ‘responsibility to protect’ those suffering from humanitarian abuses” (Wesley 2008, 371). Second, existing approaches to international aid based on incentives left the most needy states further and further behind. Third, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 clearly demonstrated that globalization was a two-edged sword, where negative effects could spread just as easily as positive. Fourth, with the attacks on 9/11, leading states in the international system began to perceive “that poorly governed states constituted weaknesses in the fabric of international society, and that the developed world had a considerable self-interest in helping strengthen their governance capacities” (Wesley 2008, 372). Nonetheless, this commitment to state building differs quite significantly with the nation building efforts of decolonization in the 1960s and 1970s. The current emphasis is light footprint, in and out, “disengage as quickly as possible from the political and social processes and focus on the technocratic task of reforming state institutions” (Wesley 2008, 374). Clearly, cost remains a factor in this decision process as does an unwillingness to get bogged down in another country’s mire of political and social problems.

Western liberal thought continues to dominate key aspects of international organization in the 21st century. The focus on liberal peacebuilding with its emphasis on rule of law, free markets, and democracy is unlikely to change in the near future. However, as Barnett (2006) notes, pushing unstable states toward unfettered economies and fledgling democracy can undermine the desired outcomes. The International Monetary Fund will undoubtedly continue to push for the liberalization of market economies as will other key financial institutions. Yet, if this is done before strong state institutions are rebuilt, corruption can overwhelm the fledgling state. Similarly, a single round of elections do not make a country democratic. As Thomas Jefferson noted long ago, while the will of the majority should always be followed, for that will to be just, the rights of the minority have to be respected. Thus, while peacebuilding, and even state building, will continue as essential approaches to peace, insufficient political will to stay the course and make the necessary investments in struggling states may undermine the effectiveness of such policies.

The Right to Protect (R2P) has been a major innovation in international law during the 21st century. However, its unequal application across humanitarian crises and government predation leaves R2P on uncertain ground. While Ban Ki-Moon has worked to shift the role of the U.N. away from peacekeeping and troop commitments toward preventive and crisis diplomacy (Gowan 2011), actual intervention under the R2P rubric remains captive to the interests of the major powers. While the crisis in Darfur was the first real test of R2P, Chinese reluctance to tackle the issue left the United Nations largely hamstrung and unable to act effectively. Similarly, Russian and Chinese intransigence over Syria allowed more than 80,000 people to die in the uprising against Bashar al-Assad’s government. When invoked over Libya, R2P became the legal cover for overthrowing the Qaddafi regime, much to the chagrin of the Russian Federation. As a result, the application of R2P now seems more questionable than ever, and an opportunity to solidify the new norm for civilian protection was ignored (Falk 2011).

So, where will the pursuit of peace take us? Will the bottom up creation of a global system for peacekeeping as proposed by Tanner (2010) lead the way, or will the interests of great powers continue to be the tune to which the world must dance? Is the future of peacekeeping operations one of limited scope such as that in Nepal (Suhrke 2011), or should the U.N. focus on preventive diplomacy (Gowan 2011)? Many questions are left to be answered.

This term we have looked at approaches to peace at the individual level, the state or society level, and at the international level. While there are hopeful developments at each of these levels, more remains to be done, and peace remains elusive.

References:
Falk, Richard. 2011. Libya after Qaddafi. Nation 14 (November): 4-6.
Barnett, Michael. 2006. Building a republican peace: stabilizing states after war. International Security 30, no. 4: 87–112.
Gowan, Richard. 2011. Floating down the river of history: Ban Ki-moon and peacekeeping, 2007-2011. Global Governance 17: 399-416.
Suhrke, Astri. 2011. Virtues of a narrow mission: the UN peace operation in Nepal. Global Governance 17: 37-55.
Tanner, Fred. 2010. Addressing the perils of peace operations: toward a global peacekeeping system. Global Governance 16: 209-217.
Wesley, Michael. 2008. The state of the art on the art of state building. Global Governance 14: 369-385.