The social context of prejudice

Order Description

Read this article: The Women Behind The Masks Of Hate (Links to an external site.)
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/26/books/the-women-behind-the-masks-of-hate.html?src=pm

Also read Box 9.4 in the textbook (p. 357)

And this: Klan Women ( L.O.T.I.E ) (Links to an external site.)
https://www.kkkknights.com/
https://www.kkkknights.com/klan-women-loties/

Then discuss the following questions:

What kind of women would join the hate group? What are the reasons they join? How does their prejudice evolve after they join?
You can also discuss any other insight or reaction you get from the readings.

Chapter 9
*
The Social Context of Prejudice
Human relationships always occur in an organized social
environment-in a family, in a group, in a community, in a
nation-that has developed techniques, categories, rules and
values that are relevant to human interaction. Hence the
understanding of the psychological events that occur in human
interactions requires comprehension of the interplay of these
events with the social context in which they occur …. The
social psychologist must be able to characterize the relevant
features of the social environment in order to understand
or predict human interaction.
-MORTON DEUTSCH AND ROBERT KRAUSS (1965, PP. 2-3)
Chapter Outline
Realistic Conflict Theory
The Work of Muzafer Sherif
John Duckitt’s Extension of
Realistic Conflict Theory
Social Identity Theory
Social Identity and Intergroup Bias
Factors that Influence Social
Identity
Issues in Social Identity Theory
Looking Back at Social Identity
Theory
Relative Deprivation Theory
Relative Deprivation,
Dissatisfaction, and Resentment
Relative Deprivation and
Prejudice
324
Relative Gratification
Scapegoating
Integrated Threat Theory
Hate Group Membership
Why People Join Hate Groups
Recruiting Hate Group Members
Group Socialization
Leaving the Group
Summary
Suggested Readings
Key Terms
Questions for Review and
Discussion
THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF PREJUDICE 325
The theories and research presented prior to this chapter have generally
focused on people as individuals in isolation from any social context. This
chapter takes a different perspective. Rather than considering people in isolation
from others, it focuses on the social context of prejudice and the influence other
people have on individuals’ attitudes and beliefs. As Deutsch and Krause (1965)
pointed out in the quotation that opened this chapter, people do not operate in a
vacuum; rather, they operate in an environment-a social context-made up of
other people and other social groups.
The first four sections of this chapter describe theories that deal with the ways
in which relationships between groups-intergroup processes-can contribute to
prejudice. The intergroup process perspective focuses on what happens when
people think of thelllielves and others in temlS of the social groups to which
they belong rather than as individuals. For example, the first theory we discuss,
realistic conflict theory, holds that people come to dislike members of other
groups because they see those groups as competing with their own group for
needed resources. From this perspective, it is not the individual group members’
stereotypes and ideologies that influence their attitudes, but the nature of the
relationship-competitive or cooperative—–between the groups: People dislike
members of competing groups and like members of cooperating groups. The second
theory we discuss, social identity theory, examines how people’s identities are
tied to group membership and how this relationship can lead to intergroup bias.
Relative deprivation theory is discussed next; this theory proposes that when people
compare their situation to others in similar circumstances, they sometimes
conclude they are not getting what they deserve. The fourth theory we present
is integrated threat theory, a perspective that explains how the three other theories
are related to each other. In the final section of the chapter, we take a look at
hate groups, groups whose very existence is predicated on prejudice, and the
kinds of people who are attracted to those groups.
REALISTIC CONFLICT THEORY
Realistic conflict theory (Bobo, 1988; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966)
is the earliest intergroup theory of prejudice, tracing its roots back to the beginning
of the 20th century. In 1906 William Sumner wrote that “the insiders in a
we-group are in a relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry, to each
other. Their relation to all outsiders, or other-groups, is one of war and plunder ….
[Attitudes] are produced to correspond. Loyalry to the group, sacrifice for it, hatred
and contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within, warlikeness without-all grow
together, common products of the same situation” (p. 12). In contemporary terms,
realistic conflict theory proposes that people dislike members of outgroups because
their ingroup is competing with the outgroup for resources, resulting in Sumner’s
“war and plunder.” _
Realistic conflict theory proposes that people are motivated by a desire to
maximize the rewards they receive in life, even if that nleans taking those rewards
326 CHAPTER 9
Laway from other people (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). Thus, people join groups
because cooperating with ingroup members makes it easier to get rewards.
However, because different groups are frequently in pursuit of those same resources,
they end up competing with one another for those rewards. According
to realistic conflict theory, this competition leads to conillct between groups;
one result of this conflict is a disliking for, or prejudice against, members of
competing groups.
The Work of Muzafer Sherif
The research of Muzafer Sherif (1966) provides what is perhaps the most famous
demonstration of the principles of realistic conflict theory. From 1949 through
1954, Sherif conducted a series of studies on intergroup conflict, the best known
of which is the “Robbers Cave” study carried out at Robbers Cave State Park in
southeastern Oklahoma. (Robbers Cave got its name because Jesse James and
other outlaws had supposedly used it as a hideout.) The participants in these
studies were 11- and 12-year-old boys who thought they were simply attending
a summer camp; the researchers were part of the camp staff so they could observe
the boys without arousing their suspicions. The boys were strangers to each
other before they arrived at the calnp and were carefully selected so that they
had similar socioeconomic backgrounds and showed no evidence of mental or
emotional problems. They were assigned to two groups that were similar in
tenus of average physical strength, athletic skills, and other characteristics of the
members. Sherif wanted to be sure that none of the research results could be
attributed to systematic differences aITlong the boys or between the groups.
Group members were given time to get to know one another and to permit
the emergence of natural leaders within the groups. During this period, the
groups devised names for tbemselves (the Eagles and the Ratders) and group
members worked together on tasks designed to build group cohesion, but the
two groups did not yet interact. The researchers then brought the groups together
and introduced an element of conlpetition by setting up a series of
games-such as baseball, football, and a treasure hunt-in which prizes were qwarded to the members of the winning group. Box 9.1 provides Sherifs description
of the outcome: derogation of and aggression toward the outgroup
Sherif ended each of the studies with activities that restored good relations between
the groups.). Sherif (1966) concluded that “the sufficient condition for the
rise of hostile and aggressive deeds and for … derogatory inlages of the outgroup
[is 1 the existence of two groups competing for goals that only one of the groups
could attain” (p. 85; italics in original).
Although Sherifs (1966) research was conducted more than 50 years ago
and used a very restricted participant sample (White, middle-class, Protestant
boys), his findings have stood the test of time. Rupert Brown (1995), for example,
noted that evidence supporting realistic conflict theory has been found in
both laboratory and field research in Europe, Australia, Israel, and Africa as well
as the United States. Recent research suggests that competition has carry-over
The tournament started in a spirit of good sportsmanship,
but as it progressed good feeling began to
evaporate. The “good sportsmanship” cheer customarily
given after a game, “2-4-6-8-who do we appreciate,”
followed by the name of the other group, turned into
“2-4-6-8?who do we appreci-hate.” [Italics in original.]
Soon, members of each group began to call their rivals
“stinkers,” “sneaks,” and “cheats.” … The rival groups
made threatening posters and planned raids, collecting
secret hoards of green apples as ammunition.
The Eagles, after defeat in a game, burned a banner
left behind by the Rattlers. The next morning the
Rattlers seized the Eagles’ flag when they arrived on
the athletic field. From that time on, name-calling,
scuffling, and raids were the rule of the day. A large
THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF PREJUDICE 327
proportion of the boys in each group gave negative
ratings to the character of all boys in the other.
When the tournament was over, they refused to
have anything more to do with members of the
other group ….
Near the end of this stage [of the study], the
members of each group found the other group and
its members so distasteful that they expressed
strong preferences to have no further contact with
them at all. In fact, they were subsequently reluctant
even to be in pleasant situations (eating, movies,
entertainments), if they knew that the other group
would be in the vicinity.
Sherif (1966, pp. 82-83).
potential. That is, when ingroups are involved in a competitive situation, the
result can be prejudiced responses against an outgroup even if the outgroup is
not involved in the competition. Gennan college students, for example, showed
nlore prejudice toward Muslims after participating in a competitive versus a noncompetitive
knowledge test, even though Muslims were not their competitors
and did not otherw-ise participate in the experunent (Sassenberg, Moskowitz,
J aco by, & Hansen, 2007).
John Duckitt’s Extension of Realistic Conflict Theory
Realistic conflict theoty is a relatively straightforward approach to prejudice: com-=petition
leads to conflict that leads to prejudice. However, John Duckitt (1994) has
pointed out that most tests of realistic conflict theory have been limited to one type
of competition, competition betvveen groups of equal status and power. He went
on to note that conflict often arises betVeen groups of unequal power and status,
such as when a majority group in a society dominates one or more minority group~
Also, in some of these cases, although the majority group denies the minority groups
the full benefit of the society’s material and social rewards, open conflict often fails to
lTIaterialize. To account for these situations, Duckitt developed a typology of types
of realistic conflicts and the resulting patterns of prejudice. Table 9.1 shows a portion
of his typology.
Two types of conflict in Duckitt’s (1994) scheme are based on direct inter~
group COlTIpetition: Realistic conflict theory addresses the first type, competition
with an equal group, in which the ingroup sees the outgroup as a threat to the
ingroup’s ability to acquire some resource. This perceived threat leads the ingroup
members to feel hostility toward the outgroup. These feelings of hostility
328 CHAPTER 9
TAB L E 9.1 Types of Realistic Conflict and Resulting Patterns of Prejudice
Image of Orientation to
Nature of Conflict Outgroup Outgroup Function for Ingroup
Intergroup Competition
Competition with equal group Threatening Hostility Mobilizes group members
for conflict
Domination of outgroup by Inferior Derogation Justifies dominance and
ingroup oppression
Responses to Domination by Outgroup
Stable oppression of ingroup by Superior Submission Avoids conflict
outgroup
Unstable oppression of ingroup Oppressive Hostility Mobilizes group members
by outgroup to challenge oppression
Responses to Challenges to Ingroup Dominance
I”group sees challenge as Inferior and Hostility and Justifies suppressing the
unjustified threatening derogation challenge and mobilizes group
members for conflict
Ingroup sees challenges as Powerful Appearance of Avoids conflict
justified tolerance
SOURCE: Adapted from TabJe 6.1 in John Duckitt, The Socia! Psychology of Prejudice, Table 6,1, p. 109. Copyright © 1992. reprinted by permission of
Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., Westport, OT.
provide the motivation for the group to engage in a conflict with the outgroup as
a way to acquire the resource, But what happens if one group wins the conflict?
In that case, domination of the outgroup by the ingroup occurs and the result often is
that the winning group dominates and exploits the losing group. Such an outcome
is evident in the domination and exploitation that have historically characterized
the relationships of the White majority in the United States to minority
groups (see Chapter 1) and to the relationships of colonial powers to the people
whose lands they colonized, such as when Great Britain ruled India betv.reen
1858 and 1947. In such cases. members of the dominant group generally see
menlbers of the subordinate group as inferior and derogate them by stereotyping
them in negative ways or in positive ways that connote low power and status.
This positive stereotyping reflects the “benevolent” fonn of prejudice discussed
in Chapter 6. The dominant group then uses these stereotypes as legitimizing
myths (in the language of social dominance theory; see Sidanius & Pratto. 1999.
Chapter 7) to justifY their dominance and oppression. These myths typically include
the assertion that the “negative” qualities of the subordinated group must
be controlled for the protection of both groups and that members of the subordinated
group must not be given too much responsibility or power because they
are incapable of handling it.
“-…., How does a subordinated group respond to the dominating group? Duckitt I (1994) proposes that either of two processes can occur. In stable oppression (see
THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF PREJUDICE 329
Table 9.1), the subordinated group accepts the dominating group’s view that it is
superior to them and submits to that group to avoid conflict. Members of the sub-=J
ordinated group may also take on the dominatiug group’s value system, r<jecting
their own group’s values in the process. This acceptance of the dominant grouP’S]
values is sometimes referred to as false consciousness, “the holding of false or
inaccurate beliefs that are contrary to one’s own social interest and which
thereby contribute to [maintaining] the disadvantaged position of … the group”
(Jost, 1995, p. 400). False consciousness leads “members of a subordinate group
to believe that they are inferior, deserving of their plight, or incapable of taking action
against the causes of their subordination” (Jost, 1995, p. 400), which makes
them unwilling to challenge the dominant group’s position. In the second process:-]
unstable oppression, the subordinated group rejects the subordinating stereotypes and
lower status assigned to it by the dominating group and sees the dominating group as
oppressive. The realization that they are oppressed leads subordinated group members
to develop hostility toward the dominating group. These feelings of hostility
motivate subordinated group members to challenge the other group’s dominance
and oppression.
Duckitt’s (1994) final question is “How does the dominating group re~
spond to the subordinated group’s challenge?” (see Table 9.1) If their response
is to see the challenge as unjustified, the dominating group concludes that the
subordinated group is both threatening and inferior. The dominating group
members then respond with hostility to the perceived threat and with increased
derogation to reinforce their view that the subordinated group is inferior. These
attitudes are used to justify whatever actions the dominating group members
believe are necessary to maintain the status quo. If the response is to see the]
challenge as justified, however, the subordinated group is seen as legitimate and
they are given the power to demand change. For example, Duckitt (1994)
noted that the U.S. civil rights movement gained ground in the 1960s because
of “the perception by Inany whites that the black struggle is one that cannot
legitimately be denied on the basis of important social values such as democracy
and equality of opportunity” (p. 107). Another positive outcome is that the
dominating group begins to treat the subordinated group with true tolerance.
Unfortunately, however, in nlany cases there is only the superficial appearance
of tolerance. For example, as was discussed in Chapter 6, overt prejudice in the
United States has been supplanted by more subtle forms of prejudice that have
been described as modern, sYlnbolic, or aversive. Whether this tolerance is real
or superficial, it provides a means of avoiding overt intergroup conflict.
Realistic conflict theory holds that prejudice and discrimination arise as a
result of real competition between groups for resources that both groups want.
These resources may be either material, such as money, goods, or land, or social,
such as status or power. One implication of realistic conflict theory, then,
is that if groups are not in competition, there should be no prejudice or discrimination.
However, the next theory to be considered. social identity theory,
holds that intergroup competition is not a necessary prerequisite for prejudice
and discrilnination; rather, the mere existence of social groups is sufficient.
330 CHAPTER 9
SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY
Following Sherif’s (1966) work on intergroup conflict and prejudice, research on
intergroup behavior virtually disappeared in the United States (Turner, 1996),
replaced by an emphasis on individual-level cognitive processes, such as those described
in Chapters 3 and 4 (E. E.Jones, 1998). Social identity theory was developed
by European psychologists who believed that North American psychologists were
putting too much emphasis on the individual and not paying sufficient attention to
the role social group l11ernbership plays in influencing attitudes and behavior
(Turner, 1996). Foremost among these theorists was Henri Tajfel who noted
that realistic conflict theory was correct in holding that competition for resources
leads to intergroup conflict. He wondered, however, if such competition was necessary
for conflict and proposed that group membership “can, on its OWll) determine, ..
intergroup behavior” (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flamant, 1971, p. 153; emphasis in
original).
~ Social identity theory is based on the concept of social identity, the part of a
person’s self-concept that derives from membership in groups that are important
to the person. Such groups can include one’s family, college, nation, and so forth.
en identifYing with a group, the person feels that what happens to the group is
happening to him or her as well (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995). For example, if
someone praises your college, you feel good about it; if someone disparages your
college, you feel upset. Why do you, as the saying goes, “take it personally?”
Because your college is part of your social identity, so how people see your college
does reflect on you personally; your college is, to some extent, part of you, a part
that links you to similar people, such as other students who attend your college,
and differentiates you fi’om other people, such as students at other colleges. People
have multiple social identities (Deaux, 1996), such as being a male New Yorker
who is a student at the University of Alabama; the particular identity or identities
that are active or salient at anyone time depends on a number of factors that
we discuss shortly. Social identity theory also holds that people are motivated
to develop and Inaintain social identities that are positive but that clearly set
their groups apart from other groups. That is, people want to see their groups as
distinct from, but also better than, other groups: They want their group to be
number one.
Social Identity and Intergroup Bias
Tajfel and his colleagues (Tajfel, 1969; Tajfel et a!., 1971) proposed that when people
identify with an ingroup and view other people as members of an outgroup,
they perceive members of the ingroup in more positive tenns than members of
the outgroup. Tajfel and his colleagues demonstrated this phenomenon in a series
of experiments using the minimal group paradigm discussed in Chapter 3. Recall that,
in this paradigm, research participants are assigned to groups based on very minimal,
even trivial, criteria. Yet even when group members never interact, people show an
ingroup bias in favor of members of their own group. Although the amount of
THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF PREJUDICE 331
ingroup bias found in this kind of research is often small, the effect is consistent, having
been repeatedly replicated in the decades since Tajfel’s original research (Mullen,
Brown, & Smith, 1992). Social identity theorists have proposed two hypotheses to
explain the ingroup bias effect. These hypotheses are the categorization-competition
hypothesis and self-esteem hypothesis, and the processes they describe can operate
either separately or in tandem.
The Categorization-competition Hypothesis. The categOriZation-COmpetitionJ
hypothesis holds that categorizing oneself and others into an ingroup and an outgroup
is sufficient to generate intergroup competition. Recall from Chapter 3
that when a particular social identity is activated, an outgroup homogeneity tiffect
occurs: People perceive members of the outgroup as nlore similar to each other
than they actually are, while seeing members of the ingroup as distinct individuals
(Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989; Park & Judd, 1990). As a result, people believe
differences between the ingroup and the outgroup to be greater than they
really are. For example, many Americans who are not of Latin American descent
tend to see “Latinos” or “Hispanics” as a single cultural group, all of whose members
share similar values, customs, food preferences, and so forth. In contrast,
Cuban Americans, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and people whose ancestors
came from other Latin American countries, see themselves as distinct groups
and can point to significant cultural and language differences that set them apart
from one another (Huddy & Virtanen, 1995). When a social identity is activated,
then, people place themselves and others into sharply distinct and contrasting
categories.
This categorization process results in people taking an “us versus them” perspective
on the ingroup and outgroup (Hartstone & Augoustinos, 1995). North
American culture (among others) teaches that relations between groups are naturally
competitive and that other groups cannot be trusted because they are out to get the
resources “our” group needs (Insko & Schopler, 1987). Categorizing people into
ingroups and outgroups therefore arouses feelings of competition and a desire to
win. These competitive feelings then lead to an ingroup favoritism <iffeet: People fav;J;
their own group to protect their group’s interest against the competition (Tajfel &
Turner, 1986). On a larger scale, perceived competition can lead people to thi
that outgroups cause society’s problems and that intergroup contact should be
avoided (Jackson, 2002). One implication of this competition arousal hypothesis is
that intergroup bias should be strongest when people see their group in relation to
just one other group. Intergroup bias should decrease as the number of other groups
increases, because people’s feelings of competition are diluted across more outgroups.
Thus, the ingroup bias is found in research when participants are divided
into two groups, which arouses the competitive motive, but not when people are
divided into three groups, which dilutes that motive (Hartstone & Augoustinos,
1995; Spielman, 2000).
The Self-esteem Hypothesis. Although the categorization-competition
hypothesis provides one explanation for intergroup bias, perhaps the most studied
332 CHAPTER 9
explanation has been the self-esteem hypothesis (Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000; CRUbin & Hewstone, 1998). Social identity theory proposes that people are motivated
to achieve and lluintain positive social identities. Because people’s social identities
interact -with their personal identities, having a positive social identity leads to
positive self-esteem: When a group people identifY with does well, its members feel
good about themselves. For example, people who identify with their colleges often
enhance their self-esteem by basking in the reflected glory of successful athletic
teanlS, enthusing about how “we won” and “we’re number one” (Cialdini et al.,
1976).
Michael Hogg and Dominic Abrams (1990) proposed that self-esteem
plays three roles in intergroup bias. First, intergroup bias results in an increase
in positive social identity by demonstrating that the ingroup is better than the
outgroup; this increase in positive social identity is reflected in an increase in
self-esteem. Second, because engaging in intergroup bias can raise self-esteenl,
people with low self-esteem will engage in intergroup bias to raise their selfesteem.
Third, when an event threatens people’s self-esteem, especially an event
linked to an important social identity, they can defend their self-esteem through
intergroup bias.
As we saw in Chapter 7, considerable research has been conducted on the selfesteem
hypothesis. Although the results of the studies have not always been consistent
with one another, research using the minimal group paradigm has generally
supported Hogg and Abrams’ (1990) three propositions (Aberson et al., 2000;
Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Thus, in line with the first proposition, researchers
have found small but consistent positive correlations between self-esteenl and intergroup
bias, with higher self-esteem being associated with more bias. Although
this finding might seem to contradict the second proposition, that low self-esteem
leads to bias, Christopher Aberson and his colleagues (2000) noted that people with
low self-esteem do engage in intergroup bias but use different tactics than people
with high self-esteem. People with high self-esteelll are more likely to engage in
direct bias, such as by overrewarding members of their groups, whereas people with
low self-esteem tend to show bias indirectly, such as by expressing a desire for
greater separation from the outgroup. Finally, the results of research on the effects
of self-esteem threat have generally supported the third proposition, that threats
to self-esteem motivate intergroup bias. This is particularly true for individuals who
strongly identifY with their ingroup, perhaps because strong identification with the
ingroup increases commitment to the group (Branscombe, Ehners, Spears, &
Doosje, 1999).
Factors that Influence Social Identity
People have multiple potential social identities–such as student, mend, sorority
member, woman, child-care worker-each of which is available for activation at
anyone time. What factors, then, affect which social identity or identities are
activated and what detennines the strength of people’s social identities? Five factors
appear to be llllportant: self-categorization, a need for optimal distinctiveness,
threat to the group, chronic social identities, and individual differences.
THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF PREJUDICE 333
Self-categorization. Researchers using the minimal group paradigm randomly
assign people to artificial groups; as we have discussed, this. categorization is sufficient
to create an ingroup bias, However, as we also noted, people are mor~
likely to accept a social identity-and that identity is likely to be stronger-if
they self-categorize, or determine for themselves which group or groups they
belong to (Perreault & Bourhis, 1999). Self-categotization theory (Turner &
Oakes, 1989), proposes that categorizing oneself as a group member becomes
more likely as the perceived difference between the ingroup and an outgroup
increases, One way of looking at this process is in terms of distinctiveness, the exutent
to which a person feels that he or s.he differs along some dimension from
other people in a situation (Sampson, 1999). The greater the perceived difference,
the more likely a person is to self-categorize on the differentiating dimension
and take on the social identity associated with that dimension, For example,
an Asian woman is more likely to identifY herself by her ethnicity when most of
the people around her are White (McGuire & McGuire, 1988). Likewise, men
are more likely to think of themselves as male when in a group of women but
are less likely to do so when in a group of men; similarly, women are more likely
to describe themselves as female when in a group of men rather than a group of
women (Swan & Wyer, 1997).
The particular identity self-categorization activates depends on factors that
change from situation to situation; as a result, social identity can change from
situation to situation, For example, social identity as a sorority member might
be low for Miranda when she attends a meeting of her sorority, In this setting,
she sees herself and her sorority sisters as individuals with unique personalities and
there are no women from other sororities present to create a perception of difference
from other groups, However, at a meeting of the Panhellemc Council,
Miranda may be the only member of her sorority present, so the contrast between
herself as member of her sorority and the other women present (who
are members of other sororities) becomes more salient, leading Miranda to feel
greater social identification with her own sorority, If Miranda goes to another
meeting at which she is the only woman, her social identity as a sorority member
may fade into the background and her social identity as a woman may become
more salient; now the contrast is based on gender rather than sorority membership,
Box 9.2 provides a real-life example of how feelings of distinctiveness can
lead to prejudice.
One result of self-categorization is that as social identity increases and personal
identity decreases, group identity, group goals, and the influence of other group
members become more important than personal identity, personal goals, and personal
motives in guiding beliefs and behavior (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994).
Self-categorization theory calls this