Behavior is how a person reacts in relation to certain stimuli. Social behavior, therefore, explains how the society as a whole reacts according to certain changes. Several theories exist that attempt to explain the changes in behavior in a given society. If one wants to understand the intricate details of these models, there is a vast amount of literature available. However, in our experience, practitioners are typically more interested in quick, easy ways to apply theory.

One excellent example of a user-friendly behaviour change framework is the following list of eight conditions that was developed and endorsed by prominent social scientists at a consensus conference.1 Virtually all mainstream behaviour change theories (stages of change/trans-theoretical model, health belief model, social learning theory, theory of planned behaviour, etc.) are represented in this framework.

This paper, as a result, will aim to explain social behavioural changes in that occurred between the West and Eastern Europe. It will deal with how wars such as the Berlin war affected both areas of West and East Europe in the 1960s. It is worth stating that this war really affected how the two sides viewed each other.

The belief that East-Central Europe represents a locus of complex family organisationand familistic societal values has reached the status of general dogma in Western social sciences and demography, and has a wide currency in other intellectual circles as well. The notion of Eastern Europe’sdivergent family developments was first articulated in 19th-century ethnographies. Whereas the German Romantic A. v. Haxthausen argued that Russian peasantry were invariably organised in large, extended and patriarchally structured families. F. Le Play popularised the notion of a gradient of familyand household types running from east to west, and located patriarchal, patrilocal and multigenerational households among ‘Eastern nomads, Russian peasants, and the Slavs of Central Europe’.

This 19th-century assessment of Eastern European difference penetrated deep into the collective consciousness, and was later perpetuated in modern historical demography and family history, which further sustained the myth of the existence of a demographically uniform Eastern Europe in which people marry young and live in patriarchal households. In the 1960s, J. Hajnal proposed the existence of an East-West gradient in European demographic behaviours with much greater force, and argued that the European nuptialitypattern extended over all of Europe to the west of a line running roughly from Leningrad (as itis now called) to Trieste. He hardened Le Play’s initial distinctionsbetween Eastern Europe and the rest of the continent, and was keen to equate the marriage pattern of several countries located ‘east of the line’ with marriage characteristics of ‘non-European civilizations’. This is how the ‘Hajnal line’ was conceived, a line that has since been often cited and discussed, and has indeed attained truly iconic status.

Whereas Hajnal himself provided a supplementary specification of differences inEuropean familial characteristics by distinguishing between two kinds of household formation systems in pre-industrial times (neo-local and patri-local), his originalhypotheses were further elaborated, reiterated and retold in the works of P. Laslett. Despite the limited availability of data for continental Europe,Laslett was not discouraged from making bold interpretative inferences from single case studies, and from proposing four sets of tendencies in traditional Europe on the basis of domestic group organisation. Among the factors that shed light on the ‘Western’ familial pattern in Laslett’s works were conflicted marriage, household formation and the co-residence patterns observed in ‘Far Eastern Europe’, even though he considered large parts of the Eastern-Central regions of the continent to belong to a hypothesised ‘large intermediary area’ between Western and non-Western family systems. Laslett’s perspective on pre-industrial Eastern Europe as representing the greatest intra-European departure from the ‘Englishstandard’ and from Western Europe as a whole was first substantiated by P. Czap’s study of a single Russian community of Mishino (south-east of Moscow). Dueto the prevailing inclination of Western scholars in the early 1980s to search for striking contrasts in familial characteristics, and the wish to brand major areas of Europe as having a particular type of household system, Czap’s case study suffered the mixed fortune of being regularly cited as representative of the whole country, and even of the whole continent to the east of Hajnal’s line. Laslett’s and Hajnal’s tentative generalisations have long been respected in the research community. Reverence for the work of these scholars, as well as the long-termscarcity of research material available for Eastern Europe, encouraged other researchers toindulge in intellectual equilibristic and bold generalisations, all pertaining to ‘a dramatic contrast’ to Western European standards in the realm of family organisation and structure.

The tantalising claims and tentative inferences of family historians (Laslett’s and Hajnal’s in the first order) provided a ready framework for scholars from other fields, and were eagerly transformed into ‘solid’ scientific evidence that helped to substantiate sociologists’ or demographers’ own claims. In a similar spirit, demographers took Hajnal’s bipolar division of the continent from around 1900 at face value, and often too hastily used it as an additional tool to explain European-wide differentials in demographic transformations after the Second World War.

However, as the persistent use of the division proposed by J. Hajnal to explain European contemporary demographic, socioeconomic and cultural differentials by social scientists suggests, the positions of ‘revisionists’ remain obscure within the mainstream discourse, and further attempts to persuade scholars to accept less stereotypical image of the families from outside ‘Western Europe’ are clearly needed. In this essay, we seek to broaden the intellectual horizons of the ongoing debate by offering an overview of almost entirely unknown scholarly contributions of Eastern Europeanists on historical family and demography. Well into the late 1990s, Eastern European literature on family forms had been cut off from the main current of European thought. It therefore should not come as great surprise that tracing the lineage of work from east of the ostensible Hajnal Line reveals sharp differences between the findings of Eastern European researchers and the dominant assumptions of Western scholars. These marginalised discourses need to be integrated into mainstream research and discussion so that scholars can gain a better understanding of marriage, family, household and community patterns—both in Europe and elsewhere. The diversity of family forms and the rhythms of their development in historical Eastern Europe revealed in this literature present us with an opportunity to free ourselves from a simplistic view of the continent’s familial history, and particularly from the one implied by the notion of a ‘dividing line’.

The Golden Age of Europe in the 1960’s was considered a time of growth. Many different areas were affected, such as the youth culture and chemical drugs and protests, particularly the 1968 student strikes in Paris, France. Women’s rights were also at the top of the list, as well as reform laws that were anti-homosexual. With all of these facial changes, there was an underlying root to these inflorescence manifestations of the Golden Age. What stands out above most areas of change in 1960’s Europe is the economic development of the states. It was the outward growth of the economy that opened the way for certain areas to blossom beautifully, as well as to spread the weeds of discontent in other areas.

It was, in fact, the issues surrounding economics, occupation, and high levels of unemployment – despite the growth of the economy – that spurred the student revolt of 1968 in France. Student populations had boomed in Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, since the government was investing in the youth culture (James, 2003, p. 310). Capitalistic growth, including political changes, public demonstrations, and movements against fascism, along with other acts of violence spread throughout Europe.   In places such as Germany these protests grew to the point of terrorism (although in small numbers). Political upheavals did not really affect – at least not in any governmental change – most countries, except France, where de Gaulle wound up losing his position of power. The atmosphere at institutions of higher learning became more laid back, and less like the formalized than they were before (James, 2003).

Women also demanded their rights and feminism came to the forefront. Many called this movement the Women’s Liberation. Feminism was all over the television, radio, and in books. One book written in 1969, called Sexual Politics, and written by Kate Millett, suggested, according to Harold James (2003), “that the sexual revolution would end patriarchy, and thus bring down conventional society” (p. 320). Yet that did not happen, even though much progress was made during the 1960’s and beyond. Women found themselves working in areas that were originally and traditionally allocated for men. This is one area that is debatable as to whether the economy affected women’s liberation by opening up this niche, or whether women’s liberation and occupational roles affected the economy. Likely, it was both.

While early post-war efforts focused on the seriousness of economic recovery, the 1960’s brought peoples’ minds from feeling fairly recovered, and spread out into other areas surrounding the arts, cultural and personal issues, and issues or morality. What is now referred to as the GLBT (Gay, Lesbian, Bi-sexual, Transgender) movement, but then focused solely on “homosexuality,” was brought to the public as a political issue, and new laws surrounding it were challenged in the courts. Homosexuality and other relationship status issues were suddenly thrust into the limelight. Many people living this alternative lifestyle desired no less than to be taken seriously, and adopted a stronger “gay” self-description, but the newly created reform laws were discriminating against this once-accepted and open European sub-culture (James, 2003). In this, and many other areas of European culture in that decade, people believed that they should be an intrinsic part of their personal and collective destinies.

Policies that promoted technological and economic areas became the backbone of the cultural outgrowth of Europe’s ultimate fate. According to information that came out of a meeting of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), “Catch-up in the post-war period was not automatic but depended on institutions and policies which provided strong incentives to innovate, that is, they enhanced social capability” (2009, ¶ 3). Furthermore, there were four key areas to growth that the CEPR focused in on regarding the Golden Age in Europe:

First, technology transfer was much more vigorous than before the war and was accompanied both by an ‘invasion’ of American direct investment in manufacturing plants and a surge in European R&D which promoted catch-up. Second, convergence of income levels within Europe was particularly rapid following episodes of European integration such as the formation of EFTA and the EC. Third, TFP growth in Europe was aided by the contraction of the agricultural labour force. Lastly, both investment and innovation were promoted by ‘the post-war settlement’ which produced better wage bargaining and commitment technologies to ensure ‘good behaviour’ by both sides of industry. Domestic and international institutional reforms, and social contracts and rapid catch-up should both be seen as mutually reinforcing.
Much of the European income per capita growth came out of innovation and investment. However, according to Francisco Alvarez-Cuadrado and Mihaela I Pintea (2008), it was, in particular, the “structural change associated with large migrations from agriculture to nonagricultural sectors, the Marshall Plan combined with the public provision of infrastructure, the surge of intra-European trade, and the reconstruction process” which truly quantified the successes of the Golden Age. With an energy and international market perspective, Gales, Kander, Malanima, and Rubio (2007) found that it was the “energy intensity” of transport and industry, as well as the even greater growth forces of the GDP (per capita) and population that caused the rapid increase in productivity and efficiency (p. 230). According to these same authors, the energy prices were very low, and USD per barrel of oil were even below the prices of 1999, with their graphs displaying an especially fast growth in income levels in the Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, and Spain during the decade of the ‘60’s (p. 232).

Enrico Colombatto (2008), in the independent review of The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond, placed the trends of the 1960’s within (2^nd) the larger framework of a three-stage process:

Stage 1 consisted of Europe’s utilization of human capital and the technological innovation of
US capitalism.

Stage 2 was when technological catch-up and production capacity hit its ceiling, which opened
up doors for international trade.

Stage 3 has continued on into today where entrepreneurial challenges continue and new sources
must be continually found to keep up living standards.

According to the above, it was ultimately the latter effect of international trade that furthered growth, since production and technology had been integrated into most of European society by the end of the 1960’s. Indeed, it had been noted by many Historians that Europe’s technology and production had originally been a “catching up” to the innovations that came out of the United States. Also, it is rather obvious that this was just one aspect of the cultural sharing and diffusion that came out of the international scene. In addition, the Cold War was brewing, especially between the U.S. and Russia, fueling distrust between nations, and pushing technological advances to extreme measures in the name of protection.   Western Europe was caught in the middle.

Emanuel Copilas (2009) covered this aspect of Europe’s geostrategic position. Where the early years brought fear of military involvement between Russia and the USA, the 1960’s and later brought the realization that these superpowers might make agreements in the area of economy and politics, that could damage Europe’s position and stability. Europe had found their economic power during the Cold War, but the USA, through NATO, had also provided them with some security (Copilas, 2009). Copilas also mentioned the tensions from within the European states:

In France, President De Gaulle opposed two times, in 1961 and 1967, the United Kingdom’s intention to enter the European Community. He sustained his position claiming that UK could offset the delicate political and economical balance that was beginning to emerge between France and Germany and he was also susceptible to the close relationship between the UK and USA, presuming that the last one would affect France’s sovereignty and position in Europe. De Gaulle also feared the German economic revival, trying political strategies to temper its unforeseeable neighbor.

De Gaulle was ultimately put out of office due to the uprisings of the student occupational revolt of 1968. It seemed that the older generation, in their attempts to support the youth culture by financing and promoting education through institutes of higher learning, somehow did not realize what the economy had done in the younger generation’s minds and living standards, as well as the morality of where their hearts laid. Where the traditional methods had worked for older groups, the young people did not appreciate these strict standards, for the international air of political power, and internal economic sustenance, had them protesting in the streets of Paris for a different kind of change. They wanted change to be the way their freshly educated young culture envisioned it. Out with the old, in with the new.

There were other areas than just occupation that were affected by this cultural paradigm. Howard James (2003), in his chapter on The Golden Age: The 1960’s (p. 307), put it like this:

Generational conflict in a very acute form, in which each side accused the other of not understanding the issues at stake, was played out in almost every conceivable arena: cultural, artistic and musical life, the discussion of sexuality, of moral behavior, of religion. What separated the two sides of the barricades was a sharply different view of institutions: for the old generation, institutions would generate reform; for the young generation, institutions were the heart of the problem, and needed to be destroyed in order to make a world that was more spontaneous and better.

Indeed, it was the school revolts of 1968 where some new leaders were discovered. According to James (2003) those in prominent positions included “lawyers who defended Baader-Meinhof, Horst Mahler, Otto Schily, and Christian Strobele, all became prominent in German political life” (p. 319). Mahler began to see the anti-Americanism trend in the 1968 left, so became party to the opposite extreme; Strobele stuck closely to the 1968 stance and was a leader for the Green party for environmentalism; Schily was also with the Green party before transferring to the SPD and eventually becoming an Interior Minister (p. 319).   Others in Britain, France, and elsewhere also went on to high political and business positions throughout Europe.

Overall, Europe had its ups and downs in different areas of history, but the Golden Age was still considered just that, and much of it dependent upon cultural and political changes that were an outgrowth of economic expansion. It was the outward growth of the economy that opened the way for certain areas to blossom beautifully, as well as to spread the weeds of discontent in other areas. Diverse as it was, Europe in the 1960’s, and its international and internal/domestic economic dynamics, turned out to be a tremendous boon for Europeans in the post-war era.

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