Many criticisms have been levied against use of force in humanitarian intervention. Some reports composed by persons associated with governmental and international careers have rarely debated the distorting selectivity of geopolitics that are related to humanitarian intervention or potential hidden motivations of intervening parties (Janzekovic 2013, pp.22). To find less veiled criticism one must usually turn to the perspective of the civil society. Moreso those perspectives shaped by independent scholars who benefit from academic freedom.

Weiss (2007, pp.41) suggest that the humanitarian intervention is a modern manifest of the Western colonialism of the 19th century. Fletcher and Ohlin (2008, pp. 38) contributed much along these lines, demonstrating the magnitude of the perils of the present for the countries that experience humanitarian tragedies can be directly linked to the inheritance of colonial rule. During rebuilding, some capitalist constraints are forced on the affected society such that they impair its right of self-government and inhibit its leadership from embracing a method to progress that benefits the citizens of the country instead of making the foreign investors enticed. Their core argument is that the so called legal narratives that justify humanitarian intervention have had the principal influence of supporting an unfair and manipulative status quo.

Dominant countries, especially the United States and its coalition partners, are using humanitarian grounds to chase intolerable geopolitical objectives and still to avoid the non-intervention custom and legitimate bans on the usage of global force (Fletcher and Ohlin 2008, pp. 67). They are at the vanguard of this camp, as they view the professions of humanitarian enthusiasm with extra suspicion. They argue that the U.S. has continued to act with its own self-interests in mind, with the only difference being that humanitarianism has been converted to be a legitimizing dogma for the plan of the U.S. domination in a post–Cold War world. They argue that NATO intervention that was made in Kosovo was mainly conducted to lift NATO’s trustworthiness.

The third criticism is based on the event-based and inconsistency of most humanitarian intervention policies (Weiss 2007, pp. 36). There is an inclination for the thought to be invoked within the heat of action, giving the looks of demeanor for Western television viewers, however, that it neglects the conflicts that are forgotten by the media, or they occur supported by chronic distresses instead of explosive crises. Henry Kissinger, as an example, finds that Bill Clinton’s follow of humanitarian intervention was wildly inconsistent. The North American country launched 2 military campaigns against Serbia while ignoring additional widespread slaughter in Rwanda, justifying the Russian assault on Chechen Republic, and hospitable to the U. S. a military official of the second-rank of a commonly known severe human rights violator – the communist government of D.P.R.K..

Humanitarian intervention has traditionally consisted of actions directed by Northern states among the interior affairs of Southern states and has conjointly light-emitting diode to criticism from several non-Westernstates. The norm of non-intervention and therefore the grandness of sovereign equality are still cherished by the overwhelming majority of states that see within the new Western dispensation, not a growing awareness of human rights, however, a reversion to the selective loyalty to sovereignty of the pre–UN Charter world. Throughout the G-77 summit that brought along 133 nation-states, the “so-called right of humanitarian intervention” demanded by dominant states were condemned.

The French intervention in Rwanda in July 1994 seems to be an example of abuse. The French government emphasized the strictly humanitarian character of the operation, but this interpretation lacks credibility given the evidence that they were covertly pursuing national self-interest. France had propped up the one-party Hutu state for twenty years, even providing troops after the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which was operational in the area out of the neighbouring country, Uganda, endangered to occupy the country in the year 1990 as well as in 1993. The French President, François Mitterrand, was reportedly anxious to restore waning French influence in Africa, and he feared that an RPF victory in French-speaking Rwanda would bring the country under the influence of Anglophones. France, therefore, did not intervene until the latter stages of the genocide, which was ended primarily by the RPF?s military victory. It seems, therefore, that French behavior accords with the realist premise that states will only risk their soldiers in defense of the national interest. According to (Weiss 2007, pp. 81), French leaders may have been partly motivated by humanitarian sentiments, but this seems to be a case of a state abusing the concept of humanitarian intervention since the primary purpose of the intervention was to protect French national interests.

Nevertheless, use of force in the humanitarian is to some extent allowed. An example of such cases is when severe deprivation of human rights arises from a direct action of the government. Another case is where the government is not doing anything to prevent widespread of violation of human rights when it can do something. The case in Nicaragua concerning military and paramilitary activities, the court constructed a way in which the intervention would be done by application of force (Murphy 1996, pp. 129).